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Abstract
In behavioural economics, a decision maker’s preferences are expressed by choice functions.
Preference robust optimization (PRO) is concerned with problems where the decision maker’s
preferences are ambiguous, and the optimal decision is based on a robust choice function with
respect to a preference ambiguity set. In this paper, we propose a PRO model to support choice
functions that are: (i) monotonic (prefer more to less), (ii) quasi-concave (prefer diversification),
and (iii) multi-attribute (have multiple objectives/criteria). As our main result, we show that the
robust choice function can be constructed efficiently by solving a sequence of linear programming
problems. Then, the robust choice function can be optimized efficiently by solving a sequence
of convex optimization problems. Our numerical experiments for the portfolio optimization and
capital allocation problems show that our method is practical and scalable.
1 Introduction
Decision making under uncertainty is a universal theme in stochastic and robust optimization. Much
of the focus has been on exogenous uncertainties beyond the control of the decision maker, such as
market demand, portfolio returns, and climate change. However, there is also significant endogenous
uncertainty which arises from ambiguity about the decision maker’s preferences and choice function
(e.g. a utility/risk function).
In practice, it is dicult to elicit the decision makers true choice function. There may be inadequate
information for a single decision maker to identify a unique choice function which best characterizes
his preferences. For instance, there may only be a few observations of the decision makers behavior.
In addition, it is hard to specify a choice function in group decision making where there must be
consensus among several stakeholders. This diculty is further exacerbated in the multi-attribute
setting. When multi-attribute prospects are in play, it is not obvious how to characterize the
marginal dependencies of the attributes, i.e., it is not always clear how much an increase in the level
of one attribute should depend on the levels of all the others.
In preference robust optimization (PRO), this ambiguity is explicitly quantified through available
partial information. Then, in the spirit of robust optimization, a robust choice function is computed
over this ambiguity set. PRO is precisely the optimization of this robust choice function. In this
paper, we propose a PRO model for decision makers with quasi-concave multi-attribute choice
functions. This is a substantial generalization over earlier work in PRO and allows us to better
match the preferences of real decision makers. Despite this generalization, our numerical method is
still tractable as it is based on solving a sequence of linear/convex optimization problems.
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1.1 Related work
This work is ultimately concerned with decision maker preferences, their representation as choice
functions, and then optimization over some set of feasible prospects.
Preferences and representation as choice functions We need to characterize decision maker
preferences by representing them as a choice function in order to do meaningful optimization. When
the preferences of a decision maker satisfy certain axioms including completeness, transitivity, con-
tinuity and independence, Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1945)) guarantees that these preferences may be characterized by an expected
utility measure. Artzner et al. (1999) axiomatize the class of monetary risk measures for coherent
risk measures (i.e., monotonicity, scale invariance, convexity, and translation invariant). They then
give a representation result for this class of risk measures based on Fenchel duality, which character-
izes them as a worst-case expectation. Brown et al. (2012) give a representation result for the larger
class of aspirational preferences, which allows for both diversification favoring and concentration
favoring preferences on different regions of the space of prospects.
Quasi-concave choice functions Quasi-concavity expresses the decision maker’s desire for di-
versification in a more general way than the stronger property of concavity does, and it also covers
a broader class of problems (e.g. the satisficing measures of Brown and Sim (2009) and the as-
pirational preferences of Brown et al. (2012)). For instance, it is known that the cash-additivity
assumption fails if there is any form of uncertainty about interest rates (see El Karoui and Ravanelli
(2009)). Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) argue that under the assumption of cash-subadditivity, the
diversification principle only implies a quasi-convex choice function.
Quasi-concave choice functions have already appeared widely in the literature. One of the most
prevalent examples of a quasi-concave choice function is the certainty equivalent (see e.g. Ben-Tal
and Teboulle (2007)). The indices of acceptability proposed by Cherny and Madan (2009) are also
quasi-concave choice functions. Brown and Sim (2009) propose the class of satisficing measures,
which are based on the idea of meeting a target (i.e., a constraint rather than an objective). Here,
the authors argue for the importance of quasi-concavity and focus on “quasi-concave satisficing
measures”. This work is continued in Brown et al. (2012) where the authors develop the class of
aspirational measures. This class of measures is allowed to be quasi-concave on a diversification
favoring set, and quasi-convex on a concentration favoring set. The representation result in Brown
et al. (2012) shows that aspirational measures can be expressed in terms of a family of risk measures
and targets.
Multi-attribute preferences Multi-attribute problems are ubiquitous in practical applications
but the existing PRO models mainly emphasize the single attribute setting. For instance, in health-
care it is typical to use several metrics rather than just one to measure the quality of life (Torrance
et al., 1982; Feeny et al., 2002; Smith and Keeney, 2005). Similar problems can be found in network
management (Azaron et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010), scheduling (Liefooghe et al., 2007; Zakariazadeh
et al., 2014), design (Tseng and Lu, 1990; Dino and U¨c¸oluk, 2017), and portfolio optimization (Fliege
and Werner, 2014). Indeed, over the past few decades, there has been significant research on multi-
attribute expected utility (Von Stengel, 1988; Fishburn and LaValle, 1992; Miyamoto and Wakker,
1996; Tsetlin and Winkler, 2006, 2007, 2009) and multi-attribute risk management (Jouini et al.,
2004; Burgert and Ru¨schendorf, 2006; Hamel and Heyde, 2010; Galichon and Henry, 2012).
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Preference elicitation Preference elicitation is a mechanism for learning decision maker pref-
erences. The majority of the preference elicitation literature adopts ordinal judgements. Pairwise
comparisons, where the decision maker is asked to choose one of two prospects, is the most com-
mon. In analytic hierarchy process (e.g., Saaty (1990)), relative weights are determined for different
decision attributes by pairwise comparison. Alternatively, the choice list method elicits preferences
by posing a sequence of related binary questions (e.g., Binswanger (1980)) that compare a safe and
a risky prospect.
Alternatively, some literature adopts absolute measurement in preference elicitation. This is a
numerical measure of the utility of a risky or risk-free position. The canonical way to do this is by
certainty equivalence (e.g., Becker et al. (1964)). For instance, one asks for the “buying price” of a
specic prospect. However, as argued by Karni and Safra (1987), elicitation by certainty equivalence
only works in the expected utility framework.
Preference robust optimization In expected utility theory, there are two ingredients: (i) the
utility function represents the decision maker’s risk attitudes and tastes; and (ii) the probability
distribution represents the decision maker’s beliefs about the underlying uncertainty on the states of
the world. In the absence of complete information, taste and belief are often subjective in which case
they may interact. The classical expected utility model of Von Neumann and Morgenstern assumes
that there is no ambiguity/uncertainty in either of these ingredients. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
consider a situation where the decision maker’s beliefs are uncertain. Consequently, they propose
a distributionally robust expected utility model where the preference is characterized through the
most conservative belief (the worst case probability), see Maccheroni et al. (2006) and Gilboa and
Marinacci (2016) for a more recent development in this regard.
Another important stream of research focuses on the ambiguity of decision maker’s tastes. Such
ambiguity may arise from a lack of accurate description of human behaviour (Thurstone (1927)),
cognitive difficulty, or incomplete information (Karmarkar (1978) and Weber (1987)). Parametric
and non-parametric approaches have subsequently been proposed to assess the true utility function,
these include discrete choice models (Train (2009)), and standard and paired gambling approaches
for preference comparisons and certainty equivalence (Farquhar (1984)). We refer readers to Hu
et al. (2018) for an overview on this approach.
In our present setting, the decision maker does not have complete information about his pref-
erences or their representation as a choice function. Armbruster and Delage (2015) study a PRO
model for expected utility maximization problems. Specifically, they model the decision maker’s am-
biguity by incorporating various properties of utility functions such as monotonicity, concavity, and
S-shapedness, along with preference elicitation information obtained from pairwise comparisons. In
addition, they derive tractable reformulations for the resulting PRO problem by exploiting the affine
support functions of the class of convex/concave functions. Delage and Li (2017) extend this work
to risk management in finance where the investor’s choice of a monetary risk measure is ambiguous.
As in Armbruster and Delage (2015), they construct an ambiguity set of risk measures via important
properties such as convexity, coherence, law invariance, and elicited preferences. They then develop
tractable reformulations using the acceptance set representation for risk measures. In a related pa-
per, Delage et al. (2017) propose a robust model for shortfall risk measures to tackle the case where
investors are ambiguous about their utility loss functions. They construct an ambiguity set for loss
functions via pairwise comparison for utility risk measures that can accommodate features such as
coherence, convexity, and boundedness, and they derive tractable linear program reformulations.
Wang and Xu (2020) consider ambiguity in spectral risk measures (SRM). They introduce a robust
SRM model based on the worst-case risk spectrum from an uncertainty ball centred at a nominal
risk spectrum. A step-like approximation for risk spectra is developed and an error bound for the
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approximation is derived and then used in optimization.
Hu and Mehrotra (2015) approach PRO differently. First, they propose a moment-type ambiguity
set for a decision maker’s utility preferences via the certainty equivalent, pairwise comparisons, upper
and lower bounds of the trajectories of the utility functions, and bounds on derivatives at specified
grid points. Second, they consider a probabilistic representation of the class of increasing convex
utility functions. Third, by constructing a piecewise linear approximation of the trajectories of
the utility bounds, they derive a tractable linear programming (LP) reformulation of the resulting
PRO problem. Hu and Mehrotra’s approach is closely related to stochastic dominance, a subject
which has been intensely studied (see e.g. the monographs Muller and Stoyan (2002); Shaked and
Shanthikumar (2007) for a comprehensive treatment of the topic and Dentcheva and Ruszczyn´ski
(2003, 2004) for a study of optimization problems with stochastic dominance constraints and their
duality theory). In particular, Dentcheva and Ruszczyn´ski (2009); Hu et al. (2011); Haskell et al.
(2013) all develop multivariate stochastic dominance constrained optimization models.
Research on other robust multi-attribute choice models has also emerged, for instance see Lam
et al. (2013); Ehrgott et al. (2014). Bertsimas and O’Hair (2013) consider robustness in multi-
attribute linear utility functions. They use an integer programming formulation to address human
inconsistency, robust optimization and conditional value-at-risk to address loss aversion, and adap-
tive conjoint analysis and linear optimization to learn preferences. Noyan and Rudolf (2018) consider
optimization with a general class of scalarization functions (specifically, the class of min-biaffine func-
tions), where the vector of weights for the attributes lies in a convex ambiguity set. Vayanos et al.
(2020) ask how to do active preference elicitation within the robust/polyhedral approach to uncer-
tainty modelling, under both the max-min utility and min-max regret decision criteria. For offline
elicitation (where all queries are made at once) and online elicitation (where queries are selected se-
quentially in an adaptive fashion), their problem can be formulated as two-stage (resp. multi-stage)
robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery.
1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we allow for choice functions that are monotonic, quasi-concave, and multi-attribute.
We do not require choice functions that are convex/concave or translation invariant. By dropping
translation invariance, we allow our PRO models to cover problems where translation invariance
may not hold (e.g. Brown et al. (2012)).
The main contributions of our present paper are as follows:
1. Multi-attribute quasi-concave PRO model. We put forward a robust choice model for
preference ambiguity where the underlying choice function is monotonic, quasi-concave, and
multi-attribute. By replacing concavity with quasi-concavity and dropping translation in-
variance, we extend the existing PRO models in a way that makes it easier to incorporate the
preference elicitation information of real decision makers. Moreover, our new framework covers
a number of well-known preference models (such as expected utility and aspirational prefer-
ences) and can be applied to a wide range of decision making and risk management problems
where the decision maker’s choice function is merely non-decreasing and quasi-concave. Our
model’s support for multiple attributes also makes it applicable to a broad class of multi-criteria
problems which are ubiquitous in practical applications.
2. Value problem decomposition. We first show that computation of the robust choice func-
tion can be decomposed into two stages: the first stage value problem and the second stage
interpolation problem. The support function formulation of the value problem is a disjunctive
programming problem, which is non-convex and in general difficult to solve. However, we
4
show how to solve the value problem efficiently via a sequence of LPs. The optimal solution of
the value problem can then be taken as input to the simpler and less expensive interpolation
problem.
3. Acceptance set characterization. We first show how to construct the acceptance sets for
our robust choice function. This follows by applying LP duality to the above interpolation
problem. As a corollary, we find a representation of our robust choice function as an aspira-
tional measure (see Brown et al. (2012)). Once we have the acceptance sets in hand, the PRO
problem can be solved exactly using binary search and solving a sequence of convex optimiza-
tion problems. In particular, by leveraging the special structure of the acceptance sets, we
only have to solve a small number of convex optimization problems.
4. Law invariance. We show how to incorporate law invariance into our model. Law invariance
requires exponentially many constraints in our first stage value problem. However, we can
reduce these constraints to a manageable polynomial number of constraints through duality
results for the assignment problem. After this reduction, the rest of our development goes
through with slight modification.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews preliminaries on choice functions. Section
3 then presents the details of our main PRO problem. In Section 4, we show how to solve the
value problem and construct the robust choice function by solving a sequence of LPs. Section 5
then shows how to explicitly construct the acceptance sets of the robust choice function. Section
6 completes the picture and explains how to do PRO using acceptance sets and the binary search
algorithm. We follow in Section 7 by explaining how to incorporate the property of law invariance
into our framework. Section 8 presents numerical experiments for the portfolio optimization and
capital allocation problems, and the paper concludes in Section 9.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with a probability space (Ω, F , P) where Ω is a sample space, F is a σ−algebra on Ω, and
P is a probability measure on (Ω, F). We let L = L∞
(
Ω, F , P; RN) for N ≥ 1 denote the set of
essentially bounded random variables X : Ω→ RN , equipped with the essential supremum norm:
‖X‖L∞ := inf {a ∈ R : P {‖X(ω)‖∞ > a} = 0} ,
where ‖ · ‖∞ is the ∞-norm on RN . Each X ∈ L represents a prospect of payoffs associated with
a decision (e.g. gains from a portfolio or the vector of revenues from a set of retailers) and the
components of X represent features of the prospect. We are especially concerned with the case
N ≥ 2 to allow for multi-attribute prospects.
The decision maker has preferences among the prospects in L described by a partial order “”,
where X  Y means X is preferable to Y .
Definition 2.1. Let  be a partial order on L.
(i)  is complete if for any X,Y ∈ L, either X  Y or Y  X holds.
(ii)  is transitive if X  Y and Y  Z, then X  Z.
Definition 2.2 (Preference relation).  is a preference relation (or a weak order) if  is complete
and transitive.
To do optimization over prospects, we need to represent the decision maker’s preferences via a
choice function. Let R¯ := R ∪ {−∞, ∞} be the extended real line.
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Definition 2.3 (Choice function). Let  be a preference relation. The function φ : L → R¯ is a
choice function corresponding to  if and only if φ(X) ≥ φ(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ L with X  Y .
The function φ is also known as a representation of the preference relation  (see e.g. Puppe
(1991) and the references therein). Existence and uniqueness of a choice function depend on the
prospect space L, its associated preference relation , as well as the properties of φ. For example,
there is a continuous choice function φ if and only if  is a weak order and continuous (i.e., for each
fixed X ∈ L, the sets {Y ∈ L : X  Y } and {Y ∈ L : Y  X} are closed under the topology of weak
convergence, see Debreu (1964)). Another example is the well established expected utility model of
Von Neumann-Morgenstern.
We emphasize the following properties of choice functions in this work:
Definition 2.4 (Properties of choice functions). Let φ : L → R¯ be a choice function.
Mon (Monotone) For all X, Y ∈ L, X ≤ Y implies φ(X) ≤ φ(Y ).
Co (Concave) For all X, Y ∈ L and λ ∈ [0, 1], φ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≥ λφ(X) + (1− λ)φ(Y ).
QCo (Quasi-concave) For all X, Y ∈ L and λ ∈ [0, 1], φ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≥ min{φ(X), φ(Y )}.
Usc (Upper semi-continuous) For all X ∈ L, lim supY→X φ(Y ) = φ(X).
We let RQCo denote the set of all choice functions satisfying properties [Mon], [QCo], and [Usc].
We emphasize choice functions within RQCo throughout this paper, which covers all choice functions
describing diversification favoring behavior. For the purpose of comparison, we sometimes work
within RCo ⊂ RQCo, the set of all choice functions satisfying properties [Mon], [Co], and [Usc].
Much of the existing work on PRO is done in RCo. Two major examples of single-attribute choice
functions follow.
Example 2.1. (i) (Certainty equivalent, see Ben-Tal and Teboulle (2007)) Let u : R → R be
an increasing and concave utility function. Then φCE defined by φCE(X) := u
−1(E[u(X)] is the
certainty equivalent of u, and φCE ∈ RQCo.
(ii) (Aspirational preferences, see Brown et al. (2012)) Let {µm}m∈R be a collection of convex
risk measures (monotonic, translation invariant, and normalized µm(0) = 0) and let {τ(m)}m∈R be
a collection of targets. Also suppose that τ(m) are non-decreasing in m, and that µm(X − τ(m))
is non-decreasing in m for all X ∈ L. Then, φA : L → R defined by φA(X) := sup{m ∈ R :
µm(X − τ(m)) ≤ 0} is an aspirational measure, and φA ∈ RQCo.
For the multi-attribute case, it is common to choose a vector of weights w ∈ RN+ and to then assess
the weighted sum 〈w, X〉 = ∑Nn=1 wnXn with a single-attribute choice function (e.g. φCE(〈w, X〉)
and φA(〈w, X〉)). Our approach does not require any weights to be specified, however.
In this paper, we are interested in characterizing the upper level sets of φ ∈ RQCo (often called
the “acceptance sets” of φ). The acceptance sets of our robust choice function will play a critical
role in this paper, both for theoretical and computational purposes.
Definition 2.5 (Acceptance sets). The acceptance set of φ ∈ RQCo at level m ∈ R¯ is
Aφm := {X ∈ L | φ(X) ≥ m}.
Every φ ∈ RQCo has an acceptance set representation as follows.
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Proposition 2.1 (Properties of acceptance sets). Let φ ∈ RQCo.
(i) For all X ∈ L, φ(X) = sup{m ∈ R : X ∈ Aφm}.
(ii) Aφm is convex for all m ∈ R.
(iii) {Aφm}m∈R is non-increasing in m (i.e., Am1 ⊇ Am2 for all m1 ≤ m2).
The previous proposition shows that every φ ∈ RQCo has an acceptance set representation.
Alternatively, given a family of acceptance sets {Am}m∈R, we can construct a corresponding choice
function φ(·; {Am}m∈R) defined via:
φ(X; {Am}m∈R) := sup{m ∈ R : X ∈ Am}, ∀X ∈ L.
In the next proposition, we give conditions on the family {Am}m∈R so that φ(·; {Am}m∈R) belongs
to RQCo. This result is an extension of a similar result for quasi-convex risk measures by Drapeau
and Kupper (2013) to quasi-concave choice functions.
Proposition 2.2. Let {Am}m∈R be a family of acceptance sets such that:
(a) Am is monotone (i.e., X ∈ Am and Y ≥ X implies Y ∈ Am) for all m ∈ R.
(b) Am is convex for all m ∈ R.
(c) {Am}m∈R is non-increasing in m.
Then, φ(·; {Am}m∈R) ∈ RQCo.
3 The PRO problem
We describe the setup for our robust choice function and corresponding PRO problem in this section.
Let Z be a compact convex subset of a Euclidean space that represents feasible decisions. Let
G : Z → L be a stochastic function that maps decisions in Z to prospects in L such that:
G(z, ω) := [G(z)](ω) is concave for all ω ∈ Ω.
Concavity of z → G(z, ω) for all ω ∈ Ω is interpreted in the vector-valued sense when N ≥ 2.
We want to make an optimal decision z over Z in some sense, but we are concerned with the
case where the decision maker’s choice function φ cannot be specified. So, something more is needed
to even formulate an optimization problem. This brings us to the crux of this paper.
3.1 The robust choice function
To take the robust approach, we let R ⊂ RQCo denote a general preference ambiguity set which we
believe contains the decision maker’s true choice function. There are many different ways to get R,
and we describe a principled approach shortly. The next definition formalizes the idea of a robust
choice function corresponding to R.
Definition 3.1 (Robust choice function). Let R ⊂ RQCo be a preference ambiguity set. The robust
choice function ψR : L → R corresponding to R is defined by:
ψR(X) := inf
φ∈R
φ(X), ∀X ∈ L.
7
In both Armbruster and Delage (2015) and Delage and Li (2017), the “robust utility function” and
“robust risk measure” are defined analogously.
We now discuss the construction of a specific preference ambiguity set within RQCo. This
construction starts with the idea of preference elicitation by pairwise comparison, in line with much
of the PRO literature (see Armbruster and Delage (2015); Hu and Mehrotra (2015); Delage and Li
(2017)). The sequence of pairwise comparisons lets us incorporate information about the specific
preferences of the decision maker:
Eli (Preference elicitation) For a sequence of pairs of prospects E = {(Wk, Yk)}Kk=1, the decision
maker prefers Wk to Yk for all k = 1, . . . , K. We call E the elicited comparison data set
(ECDS).
Next we introduce two technical requirements so that our robust choice functions are well-defined.
We choose a reference prospect where we normalize the value of the choice function to be zero, and
we suppose the choice function is Lipschitz continuous so that preferences do not vary too rapidly.
Nor (Normalization) φ(W0) = 0 for some fixed normalizing prospect W0 ∈ L.
Lip (Lipschitz continuity) For L > 0, |φ(X)− φ(Y )| ≤ L ‖X − Y ‖L∞ for all X, Y ∈ L.
We then define the support set
Θ := {W0} ∪ {(Wk, Yk)}Kk=1 ,
which consists of the normalizing prospect W0 and the ECDS E , where J = 2K + 1 is the total
number of prospects in the support set. In the following assumption, we specify that all prospects
in Θ are essentially bounded and so effectively have bounded support on RN .
Assumption 3.1. Θ ⊂ L (i.e., ‖θ‖L∞ <∞ for all θ ∈ Θ).
Now let:
R(E) := {φ ∈ RQCo : [Eli], [Nor], [Lip]}
be the preference ambiguity set corresponding to our ECDS and the additional structural properties
[Nor] and [Lip]. The next proposition is an immediate consequence of the fact that monotonicity
and quasi-concavity are preserved for ψR(E) (by the infimum). Preference elicitation, normalization,
and Lipschitz continuity are also all preserved by the infimum.
Proposition 3.2. ψR(E) ∈ R(E) ⊂ RQCo.
Now we can formulate a preference robust optimization problem. We want to maximize the
stochastic function G with respect to the robust choice function ψR(E). The corresponding PRO
problem is:
(PRO) max
z∈Z
ψR(E)(G(z)) ≡ max
z∈Z
inf
φ∈R(E)
φ(G(z)).
Problem (PRO) has a convex feasible region and a quasi-concave objective function. Quasi-concavity
of the objective z → ψR(E)(G(z)) is not our main computational challenge (there are ways to deal
with this, e.g. the bisection method and the level function method). In our case, it is challenging
to even evaluate ψR(E)(G(z)) for a fixed z ∈ Z. Much of the remainder of this paper consists of
showing how to evaluate the robust choice function ψR(E), and then showing how to solve Problem
(PRO).
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3.2 A benchmark act
We take a brief interlude to discuss how to frame our preferences with respect to a “benchmark”
prospect Y ∈ L. This convention originally appeared in the literature on stochastic dominance
constrained optimization (see Dentcheva and Ruszczyn´ski (2003, 2004)), and again in Armbruster
and Delage (2015).
The robust choice function with benchmark Y is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Robust choice function with benchmark). LetR ⊂ RQCo be a preference ambiguity
set and Y ∈ L be a benchmark prospect. The robust choice function ψR(·;Y ) : L → R with
benchmark Y is defined via:
ψR(X;Y ) := inf
φ∈R
{φ(X)− φ(Y )}, ∀X ∈ L.
In this definition, the robust choice function is evaluated over the worst-case shortfall φ(X)− φ(Y )
with respect to the benchmark.
The next proposition shows how to fit the benchmark into our earlier framework, by defining
new preference ambiguity sets
Rˆ(E) := {φ ∈ RQCo : [Eli], [Lip], φ(Y ) ∈ R},
where φ(Y ) is allowed to take any finite real value, and
R(E ;Y ) := {φ ∈ RQCo : [Eli], [Lip], φ(Y ) = 0},
where φ is normalized at Y to satisfy φ(Y ) = 0.
Proposition 3.3. ψRˆ(E)(X;Y ) = ψR(E;Y )(X) for all X ∈ L.
In summary, whenever we have a benchmark Y , we can just take Y to be the normalizing prospect
and set φ(Y ) = 0. All other considerations of our upcoming development are the same.
3.3 Two-stage decomposition
In order to solve Problem (PRO), we need to be able to evaluate ψR(E)(G(z)) for given z ∈ Z.
Evaluation of ψR(E)(G(z)) can be decomposed into a first stage “value problem” (which does not
depend on G(z), but which does depend on the preference ambiguity set R(E)) and a second stage
“interpolation problem” (which does depend on G(z), and also depends on the optimal solution of
the value problem).
The “value problem” is
P := inf
φ∈R(E)
∑
θ∈Θ
φ(θ),
it searches over choice functions φ ∈ R (E) to minimize the sum of the values of φ on Θ. Then,
given any set of values v = (vθ)θ∈Θ for the choice function on the prospects in Θ, the “interpolation
problem” is
P(X; v) := inf
φ∈RQCo
{φ(X) : [Lip], φ(θθ) ≥ vθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ},
it finds the smallest possible value for φ(X) among functions φ ∈ RQCo that dominate the values v
on Θ.
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Theorem 3.4. Problem P has a unique optimal solution φ∗ ∈ RQCo, where v∗θ = φ∗(θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ. In addition, ψR(E)(X) = val(P(X; v∗)) for all X ∈ L.
For the rest of the paper, we adopt the following notation for the values of ψR(E) on Θ to emphasize
that they are also the optimal solution of the value problem P:
• v∗ = (v∗θ)θ∈Θ where v∗θ := ψR(E)(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
The point of the above theorem is that we need to solve Problem P first to obtain v∗. This result
is helpful because it means that the harder value problem only has to be solved once for a given
preference ambiguity set R(E). Then, we can solve the easier interpolation problem as needed. The
reasoning behind our two-stage decomposition also applies to the PRO models in Armbruster and
Delage (2015); Delage and Li (2017), and suggests an alternative efficient implementation for these
PRO models.
4 The value problem
In this section we explain how to solve the value problem P. We begin with the following convenient
assumption to get a finite-dimensional reformulation of Problem P.
Assumption 4.1. The underlying sample space is finite, i.e., Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωT }, and all sce-
narios have strictly positive probability (i.e., P(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω).
Under Assumption 4.1, we may identify a prospect X ∈ L with the vector of its realizations
~X = (X(ω))ω∈Ω. This convention first appeared in Delage and Li (2017) in their work on PRO for
convex risk measures. We sometimes refer to ~X as a “long vector” because it is essentially a list of the
realizations of X for all scenarios ω ∈ Ω. In this way, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
prospects in L and long vectors in RT N . In this view, we will equate ~X ≡ X and ψR(E)( ~X) ≡
ψR(E)(X) for all X ∈ L. In addition, by the second part of Assumption 4.1 we know that all the
prospects in L (including Θ) are finite-valued. The second part of Assumption 4.1 is without loss of
generality, since we can just discard any scenarios with probability zero.
4.1 The disjunctive programming formulation
We can formulate the value problem P as a finite-dimensional optimization problem under Assump-
tion 4.1, as we now explain. Define
Ê := {(θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ : θ 6= θ′}
to be the set of all edges in the set Θ (to be used to enforce quasi-concavity). The decision variables
in our upcoming reformulation of Problem P are:
• v = (vθ)θ∈Θ, where vθ ∈ R corresponds to the value φ (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ;
• vW0 = φ
(
~W0
)
= 0 corresponding to the value of the choice function at the normalizing
prospect θ0 = ~W0;
• s = (sθ)θ∈Θ, where sθ ∈ RT N corresponds to an upper subgradient
~Z → max
{
vθ + 〈sθ, ~Z − θ〉, vθ
}
= vθ + max
{
〈sθ, ~Z − θ〉, 0
}
of the function φ at θ for all θ ∈ Θ.
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The value problem P is then equivalent to the disjunctive programming problem:
P ≡ min
v, s
∑
θ∈Θ
vθ (1a)
s.t. vθ + max {〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉, 0} ≥ vθ′ , ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Ê , (1b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, ∀θ ∈ Θ, (1c)
vθ ≥ vθ′ , ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ E , (1d)
vW0 = 0. (1e)
We refer to the disjunctive support function in constraints (1b) as “hockey-stick” type functions in
recognition of their shape. In constraint (1c), we are using the fact that a quasi-concave function is
L−Lipschitz if and only if there exists an upper subgradient whose dual norm is bounded by L (see
Lemma B.1). We continue to let v∗ = (v∗θ)θ∈Θ denote the optimal solution of Problem (1), which
we know coincides with the values of our robust choice function ψR(E) on Θ.
The interpolation problem then takes (any) values v = (vθ)θ∈Θ as input, and computes the value
of φ( ~X) at a specific ~X ∈ L by minimizing over all hockey-stick support functions that dominate
the values v = (vθ)θ∈Θ on Θ. We introduce the optimization variables:
• vX ∈ R corresponding to the value φ( ~X);
• a ∈ RT N corresponding to an upper subgradient ~Z → vX + max
{
〈a, ~Z − ~X〉, 0
}
of φ at ~X.
The interpolation problem P( ~X; v) is then equivalent to the disjunctive programming problem:
P( ~X; v) ≡ min
vX , a
vX (2a)
s.t. vX + max
{
〈a, θ − ~X〉, 0
}
≥ vθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ, (2b)
‖a‖1 ≤ L, a ≥ 0. (2c)
We note that both Problems (1) and (2) are non-convex due to the disjunctive constraints.
The next theorem verifies the correctness of reformulations (1) and (2), and it connects them in
terms of the robust choice function ψR(E).
Theorem 4.2. Suppose Assumption 4.1 holds. Then, Problem (1) has a unique optimal solution
v∗ = (v∗θ)θ∈Θ where v
∗
θ = ψR(E) (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Furthermore, for any ~X ∈ L, ψR(E)
(
~X
)
=
val(P( ~X; v∗)).
To solve these disjunctive programming problems, one has to introduce J2 binary variables
in the MILP reformulation of Problem P and J binary variables in the MILP reformulation of
Problem P( ~X; v). This leads to computational intractability when the number of elicited pairwise
comparisons is large.
4.2 A sorting algorithm
As an alternative to an MILP reformulation, we can solve Problem P more efficiently via a sequence
of LPs. The robust choice function ψR(E) naturally induces an ordering over the prospects in Θ,
ranked in descending order according to the value of ψR(E). The key idea behind our algorithm is
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that we can do this sorting recursively, one prospect at a time. We start with the definition of a
decomposition that preserves this ordering (recall that we denote the values of the robust choice
function on Θ by v∗θ = ψR(E)(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ).
Definition 4.1 (A decomposition of Θ). Let each prospect θ ∈ Θ be paired with its v∗θ−value to
form the pair (θ, v∗θ). We call an ordered list D := {(θ, v∗θ)}θ∈Θ′ of such tuples a decomposition of Θ
if: (i) Θ′ is a permutation of Θ; and (ii) v∗θ ≥ v∗θ′ for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that θ precedes θ′ in Θ′.
A decomposition is a permutation of {(θ, v∗θ)}θ∈Θ that is arranged in descending order according
to the value of ψR(E). Let Dt denote the first t elements of D, for t = 1, 2, . . . , J , necessarily
DJ = D. We treat {Dt}Jt=1 as ordered lists (rather than sets) because we are concerned with the
order of their elements. For ordered lists a and b, we let {a, b} denote the ordered list obtained by
concatenating a and b. With a slight abuse of notation, we say that θ ∈ Dt if (θ, v∗θ) ∈ Dt. We also
define vt := min{v∗θ | θ ∈ Dt} to be the smallest value of ψR(E) among prospects in Dt.
Since the decomposition is an ordered list, naturally it defines a preference relation on Θ. The
induced preference relation coincides with the one induced by ψR(E). By the definition of decom-
position, it is immediate that the preference relation recovers the contours (indifference curves) of
ψR(E). That is, prospects with the same ψR(E)−value are seated together in D.
Definition 4.2 (Preference relation induced by the decomposition). We say θ precedes (resp.,
succeeds) θ′ if θ precedes θ′ in D (resp., θ succeeds θ′ in D). For all t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1, we say the
prospect θ is the succeeding prospect of Dt if θ is the last element of Dt+1, i.e., θ /∈ Dt but θ ∈ Dt+1.
We will construct a decomposition D in the following way. We always start with D1 = {(W0, 0)}
since the normalizing prospect is canonically the most preferred with v∗W0 = 0. Then, given Dt for
t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1, we want to identify the succeeding prospect of Dt to form Dt+1. Our procedure
is based on the idea that, for some θ /∈ Dt, we only need the information in Dt to compute ψR(E)(θ).
In other words, to determine ψR(E)(θ) for the succeeding prospects of Dt, we only need Dt (and not
the values of any other prospects).
𝜗! 𝜗" 𝜗# … 𝜃𝒟$
The succeeding act 𝜗! 𝜗" 𝜗# …𝒟%
𝜗$
Figure 1: The sorting procedure. Here θ (in green) is chosen, and appended to D3 (in blue) to form
D4.
Given Dt, we want to predict the value of ψR(E)(θ) for θ /∈ Dt based only on the information in
Dt. For this θ, we define the following LP:
P(θ; Dt) := min
vθ,sθ
vθ (3a)
s.t. vθ + 〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉 ≥ v∗θ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ Dt, (3b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, (3c)
vθ ≥ v∗θ′ , ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ E , θ′ ∈ Dt. (3d)
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Problem P(θ; Dt) is related to the interpolation Problem (2), except that it only has linear support
function constraints for prospects in Dt and it incorporates preference elicitation information. By
definition of a decomposition, we must have ψR(E)(θ) ≤ vt for all θ /∈ Dt. There are thus two cases
to consider for the outcome of Problem P(θ; Dt):
• Case one: ψR(E)(θ) < vt (see Figure 2a). In this case, Problem P(θ; Dt) computes the lowest
attainable value of ψR(E)(θ) given Dt.
• Case two: ψR(E)(θ) = vt (see Figure 2b). In this case, the value of ψR(E)(θ) should just be vt.
If val(P(θ; Dt)) ≥ vt then vt > ψR(E)(θ) cannot hold, and we would have vt ≤ ψR(E)(θ). We
must then have equality vt = ψR(E)(θ) since θ /∈ Dt.
Based on these two cases, we define the function
pi(θ; Dt) := min {vt, val(P(θ; Dt))}
to be the predictor of the value ψR(E)(θ) for θ /∈ Dt. We will identify the succeeding prospect of Dt
from the ones that have the largest predicted values. As we will show in the upcoming theorem, the
prospect with the largest predicted value has the largest ψR(E)−value among prospects not in Dt.
Hence this prospect, along with its predicted value, can be appended to the ordered list Dt to form
Dt+1. After that, we are ready to find the succeeding prospect of Dt+1 and continue the procedure
inductively.
𝜗! 𝜗" 𝜗#𝜃
(a) ψR(E)(θ) < ψR(E)(ϑ2)
𝜗! 𝜗" 𝜗#𝜃
(b) ψR(E)(θ) = ψR(E)(ϑ2)
Figure 2: Two cases correspond to the succeeding prospect θ of D3
We now present our sorting algorithm for the value problem. Each iteration t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1
is as follows. Starting with Dt, we compute the predictor pi(θ; Dt) for every θ /∈ Dt. Then, one of
the prospects not in Dt that maximizes pi(θ; Dt), as well as its predicted value, is chosen to append
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to Dt. The algorithm terminates with D = DJ .
Algorithm 1: Sorting algorithm for the value problem
Result: A decomposition D of Θ.
Initialization: Θ, t = 0, and Dt = {(W0, 0)};
while t < J do
Choose θ∗ ∈ arg maxθ/∈Dt pi(θ; Dt), and set uθ∗ := pi(θ∗; Dt);
Set Dt+1 := {Dt, (θ∗, uθ∗)};
Set t := t+ 1;
end
return D := DJ .
The next theorem verifies that Algorithm 1 returns the optimal solution of Problem P.
Theorem 4.3. Algorithm 1 finds a decomposition D of Θ and computes v∗ = (v∗θ)θ∈Θ, after solving
O(J2) linear programs.
Proof sketch. Step one: (Construction of candidate solution) We confirm that the construction of
a candidate solution to Problem P by Algorithm 1 is well-defined. That is, the predicted value
pi(θ; Dt) is always finite for all θ and thus we can find a maximizer θ∗. The algorithm selects one
prospect at a time and eventually exhausts all prospects in Θ (see Lemma B.5, Lemma B.6, and
Lemma B.9).
Step two: (Lower bound) We verify that this candidate solution gives a lower bound on the
optimal solution of Problem P (see Lemma B.7).
Step three: (Feasibility) We verify that this candidate solution is also feasible for Problem P (see
Lemma B.8). Thus, it must be the unique optimal solution, completing the proof.
The Big-M and convex hull reformulations of Problem P both have J2 binary variables and
O(J2) constraints, and may require O(2J
2
) LPs to be solved in the worst-case. By comparison, our
present sorting algorithm has better theoretical complexity of O(J2). In our experiments, we will
see that, in line with Theorem 4.3, the computational complexity of our sorting algorithm grows
much more slowly in the size of the ECDS E compared to the convex hull reformulation (see Table
1 and Table 2).
Remark 4.4. The correctness of our algorithm heavily relies on an intrinsic feature of the hockey-
stick support functions. Any hockey-stick support function of ψR(E) at θ will always dominate θ′ with
smaller ψR(E)−values by definition. Thus, we do not need to know the exact values of less preferred
prospects and can effectively just ignore them. This is not possible in the concave case, where the
support functions are affine. We cannot ignore the values of smaller prospects when minimizing over
this class of support functions.
5 The acceptance set representation
In this section we characterize the acceptance sets of ψR(E). These acceptance sets will play a major
role in our algorithm for Problem (PRO) in the next section. For this discussion, we suppose we have
already computed a decomposition D of Θ via Algorithm 1. We also artificially define θJ+1 := −∞
to be a constant prospect with value ψR(E)(θJ+1) := −∞, and we set DJ+1 := {DJ , (θJ+1,−∞)}
(this convention is to make sure our acceptance sets are well-defined for all levels).
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Since ψR(E)( ~W0) = 0 for the normalizing prospect ~W0, we will always have ψR(E)( ~X) ≤ 0 for all
X ∈ L. We then denote the acceptance sets of ψR(E) as:
Av := { ~X ∈ L : ψR(E)( ~X) ≥ v}, ∀v ≤ 0.
We will compute the explicit form of the acceptance sets by using the dual of the interpolation
problem P( ~X; Dt) for t = 1, 2, . . . , J + 1 and ~X ∈ L.
Recall that vt is the smallest ψR(E)−value of the prospects in Dt. We adopt the following
convention for selecting the level sets of ψR(E) (as there will be duplicates in v∗ for prospects on the
same contours):
Definition 5.1 (Level selection). Given level v ≤ 0, κ(v) := {t = 1, 2, . . . , J + 1 | vt+1 < v ≤ vt}.
The selection t = κ(v) is unique under this convention. The next proposition shows that we can
check if ψR(E)( ~X) ≥ v (equivalently, if ~X ∈ Av) by solving Problem P( ~X; Dt) for t = κ(v).
Proposition 5.1. For level v ≤ 0 and t = κ(v), ψR(E)( ~X) ≥ v if and only if val(P( ~X; Dt)) ≥ v.
Now, the interpolation problem P( ~X; Dt) is an LP, and its dual is:
D( ~X;Dt) := max
p,q∈Rt×R
∑
θ∈Dt
v∗θ · pθ − Lq (4a)
s.t.
∑
θ∈Dt
θ · pθ − ~X ≤ q, (4b)∑
θ∈Dt
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0. (4c)
We interpret constraint (4b) in the component-wise sense (i.e.,
∑
θ∈Dt θ · pθ − ~Xn(ω) ≤ q for all
ω ∈ Ω and n = 1, . . . , N). We have val(P( ~X; Dt)) = val(D( ~X;Dt)) for all ~X ∈ L by strong duality,
since the primal optimal value is always finite.
We can use Problem D( ~X;Dt) to get an explicit characterization of the acceptance sets of ψR(E).
We first define the following translations of the prospects in Θ:
θ˜ := θ − v∗θ/L, ∀θ ∈ Θ,
where we interpret subtraction of the scalar v∗θ/L from the vector θ in the component-wise sense. In
other words, θ˜ is a translation of θ by a function of v∗θ . The next theorem shows the explicit form
of the acceptance sets of ψR(E).
Theorem 5.2. For all v ≤ 0,
Av =
 ~X ∈ L | ~X ≥ ∑
θ∈Dκ(v)
θ˜ · pθ + v/L,
∑
θ∈Dκ(v)
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0
 .
In view of θ˜ as a translation of θ, we can interpret Av as the smallest monotone polyhedron that
contains the convex hull of all translations θ˜ for which v∗θ ≥ v.
This construction of acceptance sets is related to Delage and Li (2017) (which covers PRO for
convex risk measures that are translation invariant). The difference in our setting is due to the
changing structure of Av for different levels v ≤ 0. In line with this observation, the next theorem
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gives a representation for ψR(E) in terms of a family of convex risk measures. This result also
connects to Theorem 1 in Brown et al. (2012) which characterizes aspirational measures in a similar
light. For this representation, we define the constants:
ct := − inf
{
m ∈ R | m ≥
∑
θ∈Dt
θ˜ · pθ,
∑
θ∈Dt
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0
}
, t = 1, 2, . . . , J,
and the coherent risk measures:
µt( ~X) := inf
{
m ∈ R | ~X +m ∈ Aµt
}
, t = 1, 2, . . . , J,
with acceptance sets
Aµt :=
{
~X | ~X ≥
∑
θ∈Dt
θ˜ · pθ + ct,
∑
θ∈Dt
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0
}
, t = 1, 2, . . . , J.
We also define a “target function” τ(v) := v/L− cκ(v) for all v ≤ 0.
Theorem 5.3. For all ~X ∈ L, we have
ψR(E)( ~X) = sup
{
v ≤ 0 | µκ(v)( ~X − τ(v)) ≤ 0
}
.
Following Theorem 5.3, we note that ct is non-decreasing in t since the set{
~X ∈ L | ~X ≥
∑
θ∈Dt
θ˜ · pθ,
∑
θ∈Dt
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0
}
,
is increasing in t. It follows that the target function τ(v) = v/L− cκ(v) is also non-decreasing in v,
which aligns with Brown et al. (2012).
6 Algorithm for PRO
Under Assumption 4.1, we may define the stochastic function ~G(z) = (G(z, ω))ω∈Ω for all z ∈ Z,
corresponding to our original stochastic function G : Z → L. With the acceptance sets of ψR(E) in
hand, we can solve Problem (PRO) by doing binary search over the levels of the acceptance sets.
Given level v ≤ 0, we want to find some z ∈ Z such that ~G(z) ∈ Av. If we can find such a z, we can
next search at a higher level; otherwise we next search at a lower level.
The proposition below is a consequence of Theorem 5.2, it shows that the search for z ∈ Z with
~G(z) ∈ Av can be posed as a convex feasibility problem in (z, p):
Fv(Dt) :=
{
(z, p) | ~G(z) ≥
∑
θ∈Dt
θ˜ · pθ + v/L,
∑
θ∈Dt
pθ = 1, z ∈ Z, p ≥ 0
}
.
We interpret the first inequality of Fv(Dt) in the component-wise sense.
Proposition 6.1. Choose level v ≤ 0 and t = κ(v). Then, there exists z ∈ Z such that ~G(z) ∈ Av
if and only if Fv(Dt) has a solution.
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The following problem builds on this idea, it finds the largest value v ≤ 0 such that Fv(Dt) has
a solution:
G (Dt) := max
z,p,v
v (5a)
s.t. ~G(z) ≥
∑
θ∈Dt
θ˜ · pθ + v/L, (5b)∑
θ∈Dt
pθ = 1, (5c)
z ∈ Z, p ≥ 0. (5d)
We show in the following proposition that we can bound the optimal value of Problem (PRO) using
Problem G (Dt), for some t = 1, 2, . . . , J .
Proposition 6.2. Choose level v ≤ 0 and t = κ(v), then maxz∈Z ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≥ v if and only if
val(G (Dt)) ≥ v.
We can also rephrase the statement of Proposition 6.2 in a more specific way to better suite our
algorithm.
Corollary 6.3. For any t = 0, 1, . . . , J , maxz∈Z ψR(E)(~G(z)) > vt+1 if and only if val(G (Dt)) >
vt+1.
We now present the details of our binary search algorithm for Problem (PRO). Let {v∗[0], . . . , v∗[H]}
where v∗[0] = 0 and H ≤ J denote the unique values of v∗ sorted in descending order.
Algorithm 2: Binary search for Problem (PRO)
Result: Returns an optimal solution of Problem (PRO)
Initialization: h1 = H, h2 = 0;
while h1 6= h2 + 1 do
Set h := dh1+h22 e, set t := κ(v∗[h−1]);
Compute vt = val(G (Dt)) with optimal solution z∗;
if vt > vt+1 then
set h1 := h;
else
set h2 := h;
end
end
Set h := dh1+h22 e, set t := κ(v∗[h−1]);
Compute vt = val(G (Dt)) with optimal solution z∗;
return z∗ and ψR(E)(G(z∗)) = min{vt, vt}.
Theorem 6.4. Algorithm 2 returns an optimal solution z∗ of Problem (PRO), after solving O(logH)
instances of Problem G (Dt).
Theorem 6.4 shows that the computational complexity of our binary search algorithm grows with
O(log H), where H grows with the size of the ECDS E . In line with this theorem, our numerical
experiments show that the running time of Algorithm 2 is not really sensitive to H. It is more
sensitive to the problem dimension, yet still scalable (see Table 4).
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As an alternative to Problem (PRO), suppose we want to maximize f(z) subject to a dominance
constraint on G(z) with respect to a benchmark prospect Y :
max
z∈Z
{
f(z) : inf
φ∈Rˆ(E)
{φ(G(z))− φ(Y )} ≥ 0
}
. (6)
We may then take Y to be the normalizing prospect to obtain the corresponding robust choice
function ψR(E;Y ). Since ψR(E;Y )(~Y ) = 0, Theorem 5.2 applies to show that Problem (6) is explicitly:
max
z∈Z
{
f(z) : (z, p) ∈ F0(Dκ(0))
}
.
The above display is just a convex optimization problem when f is concave since F0(Dκ(0)) is a
convex set.
7 The law invariant case
We explain in this section how to incorporate law invariance into our framework. The property of
law invariance says that the decision maker only cares about the distribution of prospects on RN
(formally, on the distribution P◦X−1 on RN for any X ∈ L), and not on the underlying construction
of prospects on Ω.
Let X =D Y denote equality in distribution between prospects X, Y ∈ L. We are now concerned
with choice functions that satisfy the following additional property:
Law (Law invariance) φ(X) = φ(Y ) for all X, Y ∈ L such that X =D Y .
Some φ ∈ RQCo are intrinsically law invariant (e.g. the certainty equivalent φCE), but this property
is not at all automatically satisfied.
We introduce the following assumption to be able to encode law invariance into our optimization
problems.
Assumption 7.1 (Uniform distribution). The probability measure P is uniform.
When P is uniform, we can encode law invariance in terms of all the permutations of the sample
space Ω. It can be shown that this assumption is without loss of generality if P takes rational values
on Ω (see Delage and Li (2017)). Specifically, when P is uniform we can just take the underlying
sample space to be sufficiently large to recover any desired rational probability.
Let σ denote a permutation of scenarios of Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωT }, i.e., we permute the scenarios
as σ(Ω) = {ωσ(1), ωσ(2), . . . , ωσ(T )}, and let Σ denote the set of all permutations on Ω. We recall our
original definition of long vector, ~X = (X(ωt))
T
t=1, where the realizations are listed in the same order
as Ω. Corresponding to σ ∈ Σ, we define the permuted long vector σ( ~X) = (X(ωσ(t)))Tt=1, where the
realizations are listed in the same order as σ(Ω). A law invariant choice function φ ∈ RQCo must
then satisfy φ( ~X) = φ(σ( ~X)) for all σ ∈ Σ, since ~X and σ( ~X) have the same law under Assumption
7.1 (the distributions on RN are the same since P is uniform).
Let FX denote the distribution of X ∈ L. Let W, Y ∈ L, and suppose FW  FY . When [Law] is
in effect, FW  FY is equivalent to φ(σ(W )) ≥ φ(σ′(Y )) for all σ, σ′ ∈ Σ. The ECDS can then be
expressed in terms of distributions as follows:
Eli (Preference elicitation) For a sequence of pairs of distributions E = {(FWk , FYk)}Kk=1, the
decision maker prefers FWk to FYk for all k = 1, . . . , K.
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We continue to use
Θ =
{
~W0
}
∪
{
~Wk, ~Yk
}K
k=1
to denote the set of prospects used to construct the (law invariant) robust choice function.
Let
RL(E) := {φ ∈ RQCo : [Eli], [Nor], [Lip], [Law]}
denote our preference ambiguity set for law invariant choice functions. The corresponding robust
law invariant choice function ψRL(E) : L → R is then defined as:
ψRL(E)(X) := inf
φ∈RL(E)
φ(X), ∀X ∈ L.
Law invariance is preserved by the infimum, as are the other properties of RL(E), so we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 7.2. ψRL(E) ∈ RL(E) ⊂ RQCo.
7.1 Two-stage decomposition
In order to do optimization of ψRL(E), we will develop a two-stage decomposition scheme as we did
for ψR(E). We will do this now by leveraging our earlier results for ψR(E). The law invariant ECDS
E = {(FWk , FYk)}Kk=1 corresponds to the “augmented” ECDS
EL := {(σ(Wk), σ′(Yk)) , ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ}Kk=1
in our basic model without [Law]. We define the corresponding “augmented” support set to be:
ΘL :=
{
σ( ~W0), ∀σ ∈ Σ
}
∪
{(
σ( ~Wk), σ
′(~Yk)
)
, ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ
}K
k=1
,
by appending all permutations of the normalizing prospect ~W0 to EL, and we let JL := (2K + 1)|Σ|
denote the number of prospects in the augmented support set ΘL.
We will first characterize ψR(EL), this is our basic robust choice function corresponding to the
augmented ECDS EL. This characterization will follow from our existing results. Then, we will
verify that ψR(EL) = ψRL(E) is actually what we want. Exactly like we did for the basic robust
choice function ψR(E), we define the value problem for ψR(EL) as follows. Define
ÊL := {(θ, θ′) ∈ ΘL ×ΘL : θ 6= θ′}
to be the set of all edges in ΘL. The decision variables of the law invariant value problem are:
• v = (vθ)θ∈ΘL , where vθ ∈ R corresponds to the value φ(θ) for all θ ∈ ΘL;
• vσ(W0) = φ
(
σ( ~W0)
)
= 0 corresponding to the value at the permutation of the normalizing
prospect σ( ~W0) for all σ ∈ Σ;
• s = (sθ)θ∈ΘL , where sθ ∈ RT N corresponds to an upper subgradient
~Z → max
{
vθ + 〈sθ, ~Z − θ〉, vθ
}
= vθ + max
{
〈sθ, ~Z − θ〉, 0
}
of the function φ at θ for all θ ∈ ΘL.
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The law invariant value problem for ψR(EL) is then:
PL := min
v, s
∑
θ∈ΘL
vθ (7a)
s.t. vθ + max {〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉, 0} ≥ vθ′ , ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ ÊL, (7b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, ∀θ ∈ ΘL, (7c)
vθ ≥ vθ′ , ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ EL, (7d)
vσ(W0) = 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ. (7e)
Problem PL is similar to Problem P, except that it has an exponential number of constraints in
Eqs. (7b) - (7e) due to the indexing over the set of permutations Σ. We let v∗ = (v∗θ)θ∈ΘL be the
optimal solution of Problem (7) (which is unique by the same argument we used for our basic value
problem without [Law]). For values v = (vθ)θ∈ΘL , the interpolation problem for ψR(EL) is:
PL( ~X; v) := min
vX , a
vX (8a)
s.t. vX + max
{
〈a, θ − ~X〉, 0
}
≥ vθ, ∀θ ∈ ΘL, (8b)
‖a‖1 ≤ L, a ≥ 0. (8c)
It turns out that, as we will show, the value problem and interpolation problem for the law-invariant
choice function ψRL(E) are exactly PL and PL( ~X; v∗).
To make this argument, we first confirm that an optimal solution of Problem PL exists, is unique,
and satisfies v∗σ(θ) = v
∗
σ′(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ.
Proposition 7.3. Suppose Assumption 4.1 holds. Then, Problem (7) has a unique optimal solution
v∗ = (v∗θ)θ∈ΘL where v
∗
θ = ψRL(E) (θ) for all θ ∈ ΘL. Furthermore, v∗σ(θ) = v∗σ′(θ) for all σ, σ′ ∈ Σ
and θ ∈ Θ.
By the previous result, Problem PL( ~X; v∗) reduces to:
min
vX , a
vX (9a)
s.t. vX + max
{
〈a, σ(θ)− ~X〉, 0
}
≥ v∗θ , ∀θ ∈ Θ, σ ∈ Σ, (9b)
a ≥ 0, ‖a‖1 ≤ L. (9c)
Next we verify that the choice function ψR(EL) is law-invariant.
Proposition 7.4. Let v∗ be the optimal solution of Problem PL. Then ψR(EL) satisfies ψR(EL)( ~X) =
PL( ~X; v∗) for all ~X ∈ L, and ψR(EL) is law-invariant.
Finally, we can verify the equivalence ψRL(E) = ψR(EL) and the two-stage decomposition of
ψRL(E) in the next theorem. In particular, the value problem for ψRL(E) is exactly PL and the
interpolation problem for ψRL(E) is exactly PL( ~X; v∗).
Theorem 7.5. Let v∗ be the optimal solution of Problem PL. Then ψRL(E)
(
~X
)
= val(PL( ~X; v∗))
for all ~X ∈ L.
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7.2 The sorting algorithm
The values v∗σ(θ) must be equal for all θ ∈ Θ and σ ∈ Σ at the optimal solution of Problem PL.
So, in our algorithm we only need to compute v∗θ for each θ ∈ Θ and then we can assign this same
value to all permutations σ(θ) for all σ ∈ Σ. We use this observation to extend our definition of
decomposition to the law-invariant case. We slightly abuse notation here and use v∗θ = ψRL(E)(θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ to denote the values of the law invariant robust choice function on Θ.
Definition 7.1 (Decomposition of Θ in the law-invariant case). We call an ordered list DL :=
{(θ, v∗θ)}θ∈Θ′ a decomposition of Θ in the law-invariant case if: (i) Θ′ is a permutation of Θ; and
(ii) v∗θ ≥ v∗θ′ for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that θ precedes θ′ in Θ′.
The goal of our law invariant sorting algorithm is to construct a decomposition DL of Θ. For
each t = 1, . . . , J , we let DL,t denote the first t pairs of DL, and we terminate with DL,J = DL.
In line with the base case, we define vL,t := min{v∗θ | θ ∈ DL,t} to be the smallest ψRL(E)−value
among prospects in DL,t.
We define the augmented decomposition Σ(DL,t) := {(σ(θ), v∗σ(θ))σ∈Σ}θ∈DL,t to be the ordered
list containing all permutations of prospects in DL,t. Since v∗σ(θ) = v∗θ for all θ ∈ Θ and σ ∈ Σ, we
seat all permutations of the same θ next to each other in Σ(DL,t). Using this fact, we define the
linear interpolation problem:
P(θ; Σ(DL,t)) := min
vθ,sθ
vθ (10a)
s.t. vθ + 〈sθ, σ(θ′)− θ〉 ≥ v∗θ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ DL,t, σ ∈ Σ, (10b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, (10c)
vθ ≥ v∗θ′ , ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ E , θ′ ∈ DL,t. (10d)
In Problem (10), there is a constraint for every permutation σ ∈ Σ, and the cardinality of Σ grows
exponentially in the size of the ECDS. Problem (10) is related to the support function formulation
for concave risk measures (because the support functions for this class of risk measures are affine).
Delage and Li (2017) provide a reduction of Problem (10) to an LP with only a polynomial number
of constraints based on strong duality results for the binary assignment problem. We can extend
this idea to the quasi-concave and multi-attribute setting.
For this reduction, it is convenient to define ~Xn = (Xn(wt))
T
t=1 to be the long vector correspond-
ing specifically to attribute n = 1, . . . , N of X. Then, σ( ~Xn) = (Xn(ωσ(t)))
T
t=1 is a permutation of
~Xn. We introduce the following additional notation to obtain a reduced LP:
• θn is the long vector corresponding to attribute n of θ;
• sn ∈ RT is the subgradient of φ at θ corresponding to attribute n;
• yθ ∈ RT and wθ ∈ RT are auxiliary decision variables for every θ ∈ DL,t.
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We also denote the unit vector by
−→
1 , and the transpose operation by >. Our reduced LP is then:
PL(θ; DL,t) := min
s,vθ,{yθ′ ,wθ′}θ′∈DL,t
vθ (11a)
s.t.
−→
1 >yθ′ +
−→
1 >wθ′ − 〈s, θ〉+ vθ − v∗θ′ ≥ 0, ∀θ′ ∈ DL,t, (11b)
N∑
n=1
θ′ns
>
n − yθ′
−→
1 > −−→1 w>θ′ ≥ 0, ∀θ′ ∈ DL,t, (11c)
s ≥ 0, ‖s‖1 ≤ L, (11d)
vθ ≥ v∗θ′ , ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ E , θ′ ∈ DL,t. (11e)
In particular, Problem PL(θ; DL,t) has a polynomial number of constraints and allows for a much
more efficient implementation compared to Problem (10).
Proposition 7.6. For all t = 1, 2, . . . , J and θ ∈ Θ, Problem P(θ; Σ(DL,t)) is equivalent to
Problem PL(θ; DL,t).
We now present our complete sorting algorithm for Problem PL where each iteration t =
1, 2, . . . , J − 1 is as follows. Given DL,t, the law invariant predictor
piL(θ; DL,t) := min
{
vL,t, val(PL(θ; DL,t))
}
is computed for every θ /∈ DL,t. Then, one of the prospects θ /∈ DL,t that maximizes piL(θ; DL,t), as
well as its predicted value, is chosen to append to DL,t, and we proceed to the next iteration. The
algorithm terminates with a decomposition DL,J = DL.
Algorithm 3: Sorting algorithm for the law invariant value problem
Result: A decomposition DL.
Initialization: Θ, t = 0, and DL,t = {(W0, 0)};
while t < J do
Choose θ∗ ∈ arg maxθ/∈DL,t piL(θ; DL,t), and set uθ∗ := piL(θ∗; DL,t);
Set DL,t+1 := {DL,t, (θ∗, uθ∗)};
Set t := t+ 1;
end
return DL := DL,J .
The next theorem verifies that Algorithm 3 returns the optimal solution of Problem PL.
Theorem 7.7. Algorithm 3 finds a decomposition DL of Θ and computes ψRL(E)(Θ) after solving
O(J2) linear programs.
We note the same order of complexity in Theorem 7.7 that appeared in Theorem 4.3. Similar
to the base case, we will see in our experiments that, in line with Theorem 7.7, the computational
complexity of our framework mostly depends on the size of the ECDS E . It is relatively less sensitive
to the dimension of the prospect space L (see Table 3).
7.3 The acceptance set representation
In this subsection, we characterize the acceptance sets of the law invariant robust choice function
ψRL(E). Suppose we already have a decomposition DL via Algorithm 3. In line with Section 5,
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we also define the constant prospect θJ+1 := −∞ with value ψRL(E)(θJ+1) := −∞, and we set
DL,J+1 := {DL,J , (θJ+1,−∞)}.
The following proposition is the counterpart of Proposition 5.1, it shows how to check membership
of the acceptance sets of ψRL(E) which we denote by:
AL,v := { ~X ∈ L : ψR(E)( ~X) ≥ v}, ∀v ≤ 0.
Proposition 7.8. For level v ≤ 0 and t = κ(v), ψRL(E)( ~X) ≥ v if and only if val(PL( ~X; DL,t)) ≥ v.
This proposition is immediate because ProblemPL( ~X; DL,t) is a reduction of ProblemP( ~X; Σ(DL,t)),
which is the linear interpolation problem for the basic model with augmented support set ΘL.
Given DL,t, Problem PL( ~X; DL,t) is an LP and we can express its dual as follows. First define
variables p ∈ Rt, q ∈ R, and {ρθ}θ∈DL,t where ρθ ∈ RT × RT . The dual to PL( ~X; DL,t) is then:
DL( ~X;DL,t) := max
p,q,{ρθ}θ∈DL,t
∑
θ∈DL,t
v∗θ · pθ − Lq (12a)
s.t.
∑
θ∈DL,t
ρ>θ · θn − ~Xn ≤ q, ∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (12b)∑
θ∈DL,t
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0, (12c)
~1>ρθ = pθ~1>, ρθ~1 = pθ~1>, ρθ ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ DL,t. (12d)
We interpret constraint (12b) in the component-wise sense. We have val(PL( ~X; DL,t)) = val(DL( ~X;DL,t))
for all ~X ∈ L by strong duality, since the primal optimal value is always finite. Problem DL( ~X;DL,t)
leads to an explicit characterization of the acceptance sets {AL,v}v≤0 of ψRL(E) in the following the-
orem.
Theorem 7.9. For all v ≤ 0,
AL,v =
 ~X ∈ L
∑
θ∈DL,κ(v) v
∗
θ · pθ − Lq ≥ v,∑
θ∈DL,κ(v) ρ
>
θ · θn − ~Xn ≤ q, ∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N∑
θ∈DL,κ(v) pθ = 1, p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0,
~1>ρθ = pθ~1>, ρθ~1 = pθ~1>, ρθ ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ DL,κ(v)
 .
This theorem follows from Proposition 7.8 and the fact that val(PL( ~X; DL,t)) = val(DL( ~X;DL,t))
by strong duality.
7.4 PRO algorithm
The law invariant PRO problem is:
(PRO-Law) max
z∈Z
ψRL(E)(G(z)) ≡ max
z∈Z
inf
φ∈RL(E)
φ(G(z)).
Our strategy for Problem (PRO-Law) is analogous to the basic case and depends on the explicit
representation of the acceptance sets of ψRL(E) and a binary search algorithm. We want to find the
largest value v such that there exists z ∈ Z with ~G(z) ∈ AL,v. Fix t = 1, . . . , J , introduce decision
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variables v ∈ R, z ∈ Z, p ∈ Rt, q ∈ R, and {ρθ}θ∈DL,t where ρθ ∈ RT × RT , and consider the
following problem:
GL(DL,t) := max
z,p,q,ρ,v
v (13a)
s.t.
∑
θ∈DL,t
v∗θ · pθ − Lq ≥ v, (13b)∑
θ∈DL,t
ρ>θ · θn − ~Gn(z) ≤ q, ∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (13c)∑
θ∈DL,t
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0, (13d)
~1>ρθ = pθ~1>, ρθ~1 = pθ~1>, ρθ ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ DL,t. (13e)
We show in the following proposition that we can bound the optimal value of Problem (PRO-Law)
using Problem GL(DL,t) for some t = 1, 2, . . . , J .
Proposition 7.10. Choose v ≤ 0 and t = κ(v), then maxz∈Z ψRL(E)(~G(z)) ≥ v if and only if
val(GL(DL,t)) ≥ v.
We can state Proposition 7.10 in a more specific way to better suite our law invariant binary
search algorithm.
Corollary 7.11. For any t = 1, 2, . . . , J , maxz∈Z ψRL(E)(~G(z)) > vL,t+1 if and only if val(GL(DL,t)) >
vL,t+1.
We now present the details of our binary search algorithm for the Problem (PRO-Law). It
mirrors Algorithm 2 except now we replace each instance of Problem G (Dt) with GL(DL,t). Let
{v∗[0], . . . , v∗[H]} where v∗[0] = 0 and H ≤ J denote the unique values of v∗ sorted in descending order.
Algorithm 4: Binary search for Problem (PRO-Law)
Result: Returns an optimal solution of Problem (PRO-Law) in the law-invariant case
Initialization: h1 = H, h2 = 0;
while h1 6= h2 + 1 do
Set h := dh1+h22 e, set t := κ(v∗[h−1]);
Compute vt = val(GL(DL,t)) with optimal solution z∗;
if vt > vL,t+1 then
set h1 := h;
else
set h2 := h;
end
end
Set h := dh1+h22 e, set t := κ(v∗[h−1]);
Compute vt = val(GL(DL,t)) with optimal solution z∗;
return z∗ and ψR(E)(G(z∗)) = min{vt, vL,t}.
Theorem 7.12. Algorithm 4 returns an optimal solution z∗ of Problem (PRO-Law), after solving
O(logH) instances of Problem GL(DL,t).
We note the same order of complexity in Theorem 7.12 that we saw in Theorem 6.4. Similar
to the base case, the binary search algorithm for Problem (PRO-Law) is highly scalable in both
problem size and level H (which grows with the size of ECDS E).
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8 Numerical experiments
In this section, we report numerical experiments for two applications: a single-attribute portfolio
optimization problem and a multi-attribute capital allocation problem. The linear programs that
appear in the sorting algorithm, and the mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) reformulation
of the value problem, are all solved by Gurobi with default settings. All experiments are run using
Python 3.7 and Gurobi 9.0.2 on a 64-bit Windows 10 platform with an Intel Core i7 processor and
16GM RAM.
The perceived choice function In the experiments, we are not aware of how the decision maker
perceives his risk preference and might simply assume that the decision maker uses a “perceived
choice function”. To generate synthetic ECDS for our experiments, the decision maker can first be
asked about structural properties like monotonicity, quasi-concavity, and law invariance. Second, the
preference ambiguity set can be further refined by presenting a set of pairs of multi-attribute random
payoffs to compare. We use the certainty equivalent as the perceived choice function throughout
our experiments. Note that the simulated decision maker will always generate the ECDS according
to this perceived choice function, but neither the decision maker nor our algorithms get to see this
choice function and precisely identify it.
The perceived choice function is constructed as follows. Let u : R→ R be a continuous, monotone
non-decreasing, and concave utility function such that u(0) = 0. The certainty equivalent for this u
is then defined by:
φCE(X) = u
−1(E[u(〈w, X〉)]), ∀X ∈ L, (14)
where u−1 is the inverse of u and w ∈ RN+ is a vector of non-negative weights. The expression
〈w, X〉 = ∑Nn=1 wnXn represents a weighted sum across attributes. When N = 1, we just use
φCE(X) = u
−1(E[u(X)]). The choice function φCE is monotone, quasi-concave, and law invariant.
For our specific implementation, we take the piecewise utility function
u(x) =
{
u+(x) := 1− exp(−γx) if x ≥ 0,
u−(x) := γx if x < 0,
for parameter value γ = 0.05.
Optimizing the perceived choice function Suppose (hypothetically) that the perceived choice
function could be explicitly identified, then the following perceived choice optimization can provide
the “true” optimal solution of the decision maker. It can also serve as a benchmark and comparison.
If we knew the perceived choice function φCE exactly, we would want to solve:
max
z∈Z
E[u(〈w, G(z)〉)],
since u−1 is monotone non-decreasing. The above display is a convex optimization problem under
our settings, since the objective is a mixture of concave functions. It can be solved efficiently by
standard algorithms.
8.1 Portfolio optimization
The goal here is to construct a portfolio from assets m = 1, 2, . . . ,M , that is robust with respect to
ambiguity about the decision maker’s preferences. Let Z = {z ∈ RM : ∑Mm=1 zm = 1, z ≥ 0} be the
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set of all feasible portfolios where zm is the proportion of wealth allocated to asset m. The random
return rates are R = (R1, R2, . . . , RM ) where Rm is the return rate of asset m. The overall portfolio
return is
∑M
m=1Rmzm, and our preference robust portfolio optimization problem is:
max
z∈Z
ψR(E)
(
M∑
m=1
Rmzm
)
.
Our data consists of the quarterly return rates of exchange traded funds (ETFs) and the US
central bank (FED) for 212 assets over ten years, from January 2006 to December 2016 (constructed
from the daily return rate data). We work with T = 40 scenarios. First, we randomly choose a
batch of M = 20 assets to be the set of all feasible assets. We then construct the ECDS by randomly
sampling a pair of assets from the entire pool of assets, and the decision maker’s preference in each
pair of assets is determined by using the perceived choice function Eq. (14).
8.1.1 Scalability
Our first set of experiments examine the scalability of the sorting algorithm in terms of the size
of the ECDS. We compare the computation time required to solve the “value problem” P by our
sorting algorithm and by the Gurobi solver applied to the MILP reformulation. Both the sorting
algorithm and Gurobi solve the problem exactly and always attain the same optimal value. The
comparisons are conducted repeatedly for five groups, where for each group the ECDS is randomly
chosen from the pool of assets.
Table 1 shows that when the number of ECDS pairs exceeds sixty, the sorting algorithm becomes
more efficient.
ECDS Pairs
Method Group 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Sorting
1 1.16s 6.60s 26.30s 67.00s 142.00s 242.00s 380.00s
2 1.09s 6.80s 25.50s 69.00s 144.00s 240.00s 374.00s
3 1.10s 6.83s 25.70s 69.00s 142.00s 236.00s 380.00s
4 1.09s 6.76s 26.20s 67.00s 144.00s 238.00s 383.00s
5 1.08s 6.74s 25.60s 67.00s 145.00s 237.00s 376.00s
Average 1.10s 6.75s 25.86s 67.80s 143.40s 238.60s 378.60s
MILP
1 0.77s 4.94s 15.95s 28.13s 78.75s 281.40s 529.63s
2 0.43s 5.17s 16.05s 28.79s 81.56s 254.67s 493.08s
3 0.68s 5.16s 15.78s 28.03s 83.01s 246.25s 484.30s
4 0.72s 5.24s 15.90s 28.38s 79.97s 259.67s 499.56s
5 0.64s 5.19s 15.13s 31.89s 80.82s 262.24s 493.64s
Average 0.65s 5.14s 15.76s 29.04s 80.82s 260.84s 500.04s
Table 1: Scalability of the sorting algorithm for portfolio optimization
8.1.2 Effectiveness of robust framework
We investigate the effectiveness of our preference robust formulation in this section. Namely, we
consider the quality of the preference robust optimal solution and the “true” optimal solution with
respect to the perceived choice function. We first study how the robust choice function value varies
with increasing ECDS size. We randomly sample fifty assets X, calculate the robust choice function
value ψR(E)(X) (ψRL(E)(X)) of each asset X (all normalized to the same scale) under different
ECDS sizes, and then calculate the average.
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Figure 3 shows how the robust choice function gradually converges as information on the per-
ceived choice function is revealed. In particular, the robust choice function (without the [Law]
hypothesis) needs more elicited pairs to reach the same level as its law-invariant counterpart. This
experiment indicates that if [Law] is enforced (by using ψRL(E)), then only a few comparisons (possi-
bly fewer than ten ECDS pairs) are needed to make robust decisions of high quality. It also indicates
that accuracy of the robust choice function can be quickly improved by using more structural prop-
erties (e.g. law-invariance).
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Figure 3: Normalized robust choice function value with increasing ECDS size
We also illustrate the relationship between the robust optimal portfolio weights and the number
of ECDS pairs. In this experiment, we choose the batch size M = 5. The optimal portfolio always
consists of a mixture of only Asset 1, Asset 4, and Asset 5.
In Figure 4, the result for the basic case without [Law] is shown in the left plot and the result
with [Law] at right. The weight on Asset 5 is at the top (purple area), the weight on Asset 4 is in
the middle (red area), and the weight on Asset 1 is on the bottom (blue area). The true optimal
solution under the perceived choice function is to put all weight on Asset 5. We see that when
there are more than five ECDS pairs, the law invariant model already reaches a stable solution that
matches the “true” optimal solution under the perceived choice function. The model without [Law]
reaches a stable solution when there are more than twenty ECDS pairs, with a small optimality gap.
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Figure 4: Robust optimal solution for portfolio optimization in the base case (left) and the law-
invariant case (right)
In the next experiment, we compare the perceived choice function value of the optimal solutions of
four different models: our robust choice function, our robust law-invariant choice function, expected
return, and the perceived choice function itself. In each experimental run, we randomly select twenty
assets from the pool as the batch. Then, for each model, we calculate the perceived choice function
values of the solutions proposed by PRO with and without [Law], expected return maximization, and
perceived choice function maximization. We conduct 500 experimental runs and then calculate the
average of the optimal choice function values. These values serve as a measure of the performance of
PRO. In some sense, they represent how good the decision maker feels about the solutions proposed
by an advisor using PRO.
In Figure 5, we see that the performance of PRO improves as the size of the ECDS increases. We
also note that the robust law-invariant choice function always outperforms our basic robust choice
function without [Law]. We conjecture that this is because the perceived choice function (certainty
equivalent) is law-invariant. Finally, we see that the robust law-invariant choice function is fairly
close to ground truth when the size of the ECDS is greater than ten. In this case, enforcing [Law]
greatly improves the fidelity of our robust approach with respect to the ground truth.
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Figure 5: Performance of the portfolios proposed by different methods
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8.2 Capital allocation
Our next application is to scenario dependent capital allocation. Consider a financial institution
consisting of sub-units n = 1, 2, . . . , N . The overall financial institution is represented by the random
vector
X = (X1(ωt), X2(ωt), . . . , XN (ωt))
T
t=1,
where we interpret each Xn as the random revenue of sub-unit n = 1, . . . , N . Define
Z = {Z ∈ L :
N∑
n=1
Zn(ωt) ≤ B, Z(ωt) ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, . . . , T},
to be the set of admissible scenario-dependent financial recourse decisions subject to a budget con-
straint B > 0. Given a benchmark random vector Y which denotes an acceptable position for the
overall institution (in terms of the vector of revenues from each sub-unit), our problem is to solve:
max
Z∈Z
ψR(E)(X + Z; Y ).
This problem seeks an overall position X that dominates the benchmark Y . If the optimal value
of this problem is zero, it means that our budget is sufficiently large to match the benchmark.
Otherwise, if the optimal value of this problem is negative, it means that we do not have enough
budget on hand.
There is a systematic risk factor ϕ ∼ Normal(0, 2%) common to all sub-units and an idiosyn-
cratic risk factor ξn ∼ Normal(n× 3%, n× 2.5%) specific to sub-unit n = 1, 2, . . . , N . We then set
the return to be Xn = 10(ϕ+ ξn), which is similar to the experimental setup in Esfahani and Kuhn
(2018). To construct ECDS for our experiments, we randomly generate samples of financial returns
according to this setup. Again, the decision maker’s preference in each pair of assets is determined
by using the perceived choice function in Eq. (14). We randomly select the weight vector w, and
set the budget to be B = 0.5.
8.2.1 Scalability
To test the scalability of our sorting algorithm, we model an institution with N = 20 sub-units on
T = 20 scenarios. The computation times required by our sorting algorithm and MILP by Gurobi
are presented in Table 2. Here, the difference in required computation time between our sorting
algorithm and Gurobi is much more pronounced compared to our previous portfolio optimization
problem. As for that problem, here we also do comparisons among five groups where the ECDS is
randomly generated for each group.
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ECDS Pairs
Method Group 10 20 30 40 50
Sorting
1 15.6s 97s 364s 841s 1631s
2 13.2s 107s 350s 826s 1539s
3 12.5s 99s 326s 808s 1483s
4 12.6s 107s 342s 823s 1651s
5 13s 97s 337s 781s 1545s
Average 13.38s 101.4s 343.8s 815.8s 1569.8s
MILP
1 7.16s 56.13s 185.78s 3728.40s 22109.66s
2 4.64s 59.92s 254.80s 5312.21s 31019.20s
3 6.47s 90.27s 450.12s 6560.72s 38534.88s
4 5.30s 71.62s 387.61s 5666.33s 36112.33s
5 5.18s 38.9s 278.50s 5449.45s 32334.57s
Average 5.75s 69.48s 296.90 5343.42s 32022.13s
Table 2: Scalability of the sorting algorithm for capital allocation
We next consider scalability of our law invariant sorting algorithm. Table 3 suggests that the law
invariant sorting algorithm is highly scalable in terms of the number of scenarios and the number of
attributes. Note that the most rapid growth in run time is with the number of ECDS pairs. This
result is not surprising since according to Theorem 7.7, our theoretical complexity bound grows
quadratically in the number of ECDS pairs.
ECDS Pairs
Settings Group 1 2 5 10 20 50 80
20 Scen, 20 Attr
1 52.9ms 437ms 7.19s 52.4s 506s 6715s 28284s
2 47.5ms 420ms 7.12s 52.8s 507s 6822s 30111s
3 52ms 445ms 7.28s 52.5s 508s 6720s 27765s
4 50.2ms 440ms 7.2s 53s 511s 6669s 28202s
5 51.8ms 444ms 7.22s 52.4s 512s 6733s 28116s
Average 50.88ms 437.2ms 7.202s 52.62s 508.8s 6731.8s 28495.6s
Number of Scenarios
Settings Group 5 10 15 20 50 100 200
10 Pairs, 20 Attr
1 6.64s 17s 33.4s 54.3s 274s 1141s 4532s
2 6.75s 17.1s 33.2s 55.1s 274s 1222s 4605s
3 6.58s 16.8s 33.3s 52.8s 280s 1088s 4520s
4 6.32s 17.9s 33.6s 54.2s 269s 1050s 4330s
5 6.67s 16.9s 33.8s 55s 271s 1150s 4567s
Average 6.592ms 17.14s 33.46s 54.28s 273.6s 1130.2s 4510.8s
Number of Attributes
Settings Group 5 10 15 20 50 100 200
10 Pairs, 20 Scen
1 21s 31s 40.9s 51.5s 124s 246s 480s
2 20s 31s 40.6s 51.2s 122s 244s 484s
3 19s 31s 40.7s 51.6s 123s 248s 482s
4 20s 30s 41.2s 52.2s 126s 250s 480s
5 21s 32s 41s 51.8s 124s 246s 481s
Average 20.2s 31s 40.88s 51.66s 123.8s 246.8s 481.4s
Table 3: Scalability of the sorting algorithm for capital allocation (law-invariant case)
Now we study the scalability of the binary search algorithm for the capital allocation problem
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(which takes the optimal solution of the value problem as input). Table 4 suggests that the algorithm
is highly scalable in terms of the size of the ECDS, the number of attributes, and the number of
scenarios.
ECDS Pairs
Settings Group 1 2 5 10 20 50 80
20 Scen, 20 Attr
1 576ms 867ms 1.21s 1.46s 1.84s 2.38s 4.56s
2 532ms 902ms 1.17s 1.51s 1.82s 2.32s 4.62s
3 555ms 855ms 1.15s 1.45s 1.81s 2.4s 4.88s
4 546ms 832ms 1.22s 1.47s 1.85s 2.33s 4.67s
5 612ms 841ms 1.23s 1.46s 1.9s 2.35s 4.51s
Average 564.2ms 859.4ms 1.196s 1.47s 1.844s 2.356s 4.648s
Number of Scenarios
Settings Group 5 10 15 20 50 100 200
10 Pairs, 20 Attr
1 153ms 414ms 1.02s 1.46s 8.8s 40s 181s
2 115ms 414ms 924ms 1.36s 9.79s 35s 177s
3 130ms 376ms 919ms 1.32s 10s 38s 190s
4 119ms 427ms 917ms 1.33s 7.88s 42s 176s
5 131ms 425ms 922ms 1.42s 9.47s 40s 183s
Average 129.6ms 417.2ms 940.4ms 1.378s 9.188s 39s 181.4s
Number of Attributes
Settings Group 5 10 15 20 50 100 200
10 Pairs, 20 Scen
1 402ms 745ms 1.42s 1.6s 4.56 9.42s 18.5s
2 398ms 740ms 1.38s 1.55s 4.6s 9.44s 18.7s
3 396ms 740ms 1.37s 1.56s 4.61s 9.45s 19s
4 408ms 750ms 1.45s 1.61s 4.6s 9.39s 18.8s
5 405ms 744ms 1.44s 1.61s 4.56s 9.4s 18.9s
Average 401.8ms 743.8ms 1.412s 1.586s 4.586s 9.42s 18.78s
Table 4: Scalability of the binary search algorithm for capital allocation
8.2.2 Effectiveness of robust framework
The effectiveness of our robust approach for the capital allocation problem is studied. In particular,
we want to know how well our robust choice function approximates the perceived choice function
for different sizes of the ECDS and how the PRO solutions are compared with the true benchmark
solution.
We first test the robust choice function value with increasing ECDS size. We randomly sample
500 financial positions X, calculate the robust choice function value ψR(E)(X) (ψRL(E)(X)) of each
financial position X under ECDS with different sizes, and calculate the average. Figure 6 shows the
average of robust choice function values when there are T = 4 scenarios and N = 4 sub-units. This
figure shows how the robust choice function gradually “converges” as more pairwise comparison
data is given. As we saw earlier, this experiment indicates that if [Law] is enforced then only a
few comparisons (possibly fewer than ten ECDS pairs) are needed to make robust decisions of high
quality.
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Figure 6: Robust choice function value with increasing ECDS size (T = 4 and N = 4)
The out-of-sample tests on the robust choice function for N = 2 sub-units on T = 2 scenarios is
performed as follows. The purpose of this experiment is to see how well the predictions of the robust
choice function match the perceived choice function. For different sizes of the training ECDS pairs,
we record the number of violations on twenty pairs of test ECDS. Table 5 shows that the number
of violations decreases as the size of the training data set increases on the whole. Enforcing law
invariance seems to increase the quality of the predictions overall.
“Training” ECDS size
Group Model 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256
1
Base Case 5 5 5 6 6 6 4 4 2
Law-Invariant Case 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 2 2
2
Base Case 13 13 13 13 11 12 5 1 1
Law-Invariant Case 9 9 6 6 6 5 3 1 0
3
Base Case 13 12 8 8 7 7 3 1 0
Law-Invariant Case 9 9 9 9 3 3 0 0 0
4
Base Case 11 11 13 10 13 4 4 4 2
Law-Invariant Case 10 10 10 11 9 2 2 1 1
5
Base Case 12 9 9 5 5 3 2 1 1
Law-Invariant Case 7 7 8 7 5 3 1 1 0
Table 5: Out-of-sample test of the robust choice function with increasing ECDS size
The final experiment tests the performance of the capital allocation plans proposed by different
models: robust choice function, robust law-invariant choice function, expected return, and the per-
ceived choice function. In each experimental run, we randomly select twenty assets from the pool.
Then, for each model, we calculate the perceived choice function values of the solutions proposed by
PRO with and without [Law], expected return maximization, and perceived choice maximization.
For the expected return, we use the uniform weight w0 = (
1
N , . . . ,
1
N ) as our guess because the
ground truth is unknown. We conduct 500 experimental runs and calculate the average, the results
are shown in Figure 7.
Similar to the portfolio optimization problem, law-invariant PRO better matches the perceived
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Figure 7: Performance of the allocation plans proposed by different methods (T = 4 and N = 4)
choice function (which is also law-invariant). Second, the performance of both PRO and PRO with
[Law] improves as we increase the size of the ECDS. However, we see that the convergence rate of
law-invariant PRO is slower here than it was in the portfolio problem. One possible explanation is
that, in the multi-attribute case, enforcing [Law] only facilitates learning among different scenarios,
but not different attributes. Hence, one can argue that more elicited pairs are needed to achieve the
same performance for multi-attribute PRO compared to the single-attribute case.
9 Conclusions
This paper has put forward a new framework for doing PRO. The distinguishing features of our
framework are its emphasis on (i) quasi-concavity and (ii) its support for multi-attribute prospects.
Compared to concavity, quasi-concavity allows for a broader expression of preferences in utility and
risk. Many decision problems are fundamentally multi-attribute, and our framework avoids the need
to assign artificial weights to each attribute to do optimization.
We show that we can solve our class of PRO problems efficiently. As our main methodological
contribution, we demonstrate that this class of robust choice functions can be decomposed into a
value problem and an interpolation problem. Then, we prove that the value problem can be solved
by a sequence of LPs that are polynomial in the size of the ECDS. Once the value problem is solved,
we can optimize the robust choice function by solving a sequence of convex optimization problems
(that depend on the acceptance sets which we are able to compute explicitly).
Our numerical experiments show that our method has practical computational complexity in
terms of the number of scenarios, attributes, and the size of the ECDS - even in the law invariant
case. The greatest computational expenditure is on the value problem. Once the value problem is
solved, finding the optimal PRO solution can generally be done quickly. The robust choice function
is also independent of the problem at hand, it only depends on the preference elicitation information
of the decision maker. Once the effort is made to solve it, the same information can be re-used later
in related applications.
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A Proofs for Section 3 (the PRO problem)
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3 (formulation of robust choice function with
benchmark)
We are concerned with the relative difference φ(X)− φ(Y ), so we do not have to force φ(Y ) to take
a specific value. To understand how a benchmark changes the setup, let us momentarily withdraw
the normalization requirement from R(E) and define:
Rˆ(E) := {φ ∈ RQCo : [Eli], [Lip], φ(Y ) ∈ R}.
We require φ(Y ) to be finite-valued (i.e., φ(Y ) ∈ R) to avoid the situation where ψRˆ(E)(X;Y ) = −∞
for some X ∈ L.
We can define the sets
Rˆm(E) := {φ ∈ Rˆ(E) : φ(Y ) = m}, ∀m ∈ R,
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to form the partition Rˆ(E) = ∪m∈RRˆm(E). Consequently,
ψRˆ(E)(X;Y ) = inf
φ∈Rˆ(E)
{φ(X)− φ(Y )} = inf
φ∈∪m∈RRˆm(E)
{φ(X)− φ(Y )}
= inf
m∈R
inf
φ∈Rˆm(E)
{φ(X)− φ(Y )} = inf
φ∈Rˆ0(E)
{φ(X)− φ(Y )}
= inf
φ∈Rˆ0(E)
φ(X),
where the second-to-last equality uses the fact that φ ∈ Rˆ0(E) if and only if φ+m ∈ Rˆm(E) for all
m ∈ R, and the last equality uses the fact that φ(Y ) = 0 for all φ ∈ Rˆ0(E). Using the new preference
ambiguity set R(E ;Y ) := {φ ∈ RQCo : [Eli], [Lip], φ(Y ) = 0} normalized at the benchmark, we
then have ψRˆ(E)(X;Y ) = ψR(E;Y )(X) for all X ∈ L.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.4 (two-stage decomposition)
We make use of the following technical lemma in our upcoming argument, it just shows that the
preference ambiguity set R (E) is closed under minimization.
Lemma A.1. Let φ1, . . . , φI ∈ R (E) and define ψ (·) := infi=1,..., I φi (·), then ψ ∈ R (E).
Proof. The function ψ is monotonic, quasi-concave, and L−Lipschitz since these properties are all
preserved under minimization. Similarly, for each k = 1, . . . , K, since φi (Wk) ≥ φi (Yk) for all
i = 1, . . . , I, we must have ψ (Wk) ≥ ψ (Yk). Finally, since φi (W0) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I, we must
have ψ (W0) = 0.
For each θ ∈ Θ, let us consider the problem:
P(θ) := inf
φ∈R(E)
φ(θ),
which just tries to minimize φ(θ) over all φ ∈ R (E) (in contrast to the value problem P which
minimizes the sum of the values φ(θ) over all θ ∈ Θ). For each θ ∈ Θ, let φ∗θ ∈ R (E) be an optimal
solution of Problem P(θ). By Lemma A.1, the set R (E) is closed under minimization, so we must
have φ∗ := minθ∈Θ φ∗θ ∈ R (E) as well. This implies that ψR(E)(θ) ≤ φ∗(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. But
φ∗(θ) = φ∗θ(θ) ≤ φ(θ) for all φ ∈ R (E) and θ ∈ Θ. Subsequently∑
θ∈Θ
φ∗ (θ) =
∑
θ∈Θ
φ∗θ (θ) ≤
∑
θ∈Θ
φ(θ),
for any feasible φ ∈ R(E). It follows that φ∗(θ) = ψR(E)(θ) must hold for all θ ∈ Θ, and we have the
lower bound
∑
θ∈Θ φ
∗
θ(θ) on the optimal value of Problem P. Since φ(θ) ≥ φ∗θ(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, this
lower bound is only attained for φ ∈ RQCo such that φ(θ) = φ∗θ(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, the optimal
solution of Problem P has the unique values φ∗θ(θ) = ψR(E)(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
We now show that evaluation of ψR(E)(X) for some X ∈ L can be thought of as minimizing
φ(X) over the support functions φ ∈ RQCo of ψR(E) at X ∈ L.
Lemma A.2. For all X ∈ L, we have
ψR(E)(X) = inf
φ∈RQCo
{φ(X) : [Lip], φ(θ) ≥ ψR(E)(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ}.
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Proof. Define
ψ˜(X) := inf
φ∈RQCo
{φ(X) : [Lip], φ(θ) ≥ ψR(E)(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ}.
It is immediate that ψ˜(X) ≤ ψR(E)(X), since ψ˜ is only required to majorize ψR(E) on Θ (and not
on all of L). For the other direction, note that the set {φ ∈ RQCo : [Lip], φ(θ) ≥ ψR(E)(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ}
is closed under minimization, so we have
ψ˜(X) = inf
φ∈RQCo
{φ(X) : [Lip], φ(θ) = ψR(E)(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ}.
Then, we see that ψ˜ satisfies [Nor], [Lip], and [Eli] and thus ψ˜ ∈ R(E). It follows that ψR(E)(X) ≤
ψ˜(X) must also hold, completing the argument.
B Proofs for Section 4 (the value problem)
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2 (disjunctive programming reformulation)
We confirm that the value Problem P and the interpolation problem P( ~X; v∗) can both be expressed
as disjunctive programming problems for a finite sample space Ω. We begin with a technical lemma
that characterizes Lipschitz continuous quasi-concave functions in terms of their upper subgradients.
Lemma B.1. Let ‖ · ‖ be a norm on Rd and let ‖ · ‖∗ be its dual norm. A quasi-concave function
f : Rd → R is L−Lipschitz with respect to ‖ · ‖ if and only if for every x ∈ Rd, there exists an upper
subgradient a ∈ ∂+f(x) such that ‖a‖∗ ≤ L.
Proof. See Plastria (1985) for the proof of the case for the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖2. This proof
can be generalized to any norm using the general Cauchy-Schwarz inequality 〈x, y〉 ≤ ‖x‖∗‖y‖ for
all x, y ∈ Rd.
Suppose that for every x ∈ Rd, there exists an upper subgradient a ∈ ∂+f(x) such that ‖a‖∗ ≤ L.
Let y ∈ Rd and assume without loss of generality that f(y) > f(x). Then 0 < f(y) − f(x) ≤
〈a, y − x〉 ≤ ‖a‖∗‖y − x‖ ≤ L‖y − x‖.
For the other direction, suppose that f is L−Lipschitz and quasi-concave. For any x ∈ Rd,
suppose the upper level set of f at x is S, which is convex by quasi-concavity of f . Then, there
exists a separating hyperplane for x and S. Specifically, there exists a0 with ‖a0‖ = 1 such that for
any y ∈ S, the inequality 〈y − x, a0〉 ≥ 0 holds.
Let a = La0/‖a0‖∗, we will prove that a is an upper-subgradient of f . Let e0 = arg max‖e‖=1〈e, a〉.
Then, by the definition of the dual norm, we have 〈e0, a〉 = ‖a‖∗. For any y ∈ S, let y′ lie on the
separating hyperplane such that 〈a0, y′ − x〉 = 0 with y − y′ = ‖y − y′‖ e0. Then, we have
〈a, y − x〉 = 〈a, y − y′〉 = 〈a, e0〉‖y − y′‖ = ‖a‖∗‖y − y′‖ = L‖y − y′‖.
On the other hand, we have f(y′) ≤ f(x) since y′ lies on the separating hyperplane. By Lipschitz
continuity of f , it follows that
f(y)− f(x) ≤ f(y)− f(y′) ≤ L‖y − y′‖.
Combining the above two inequalities, we have f(y)−f(x) ≤ 〈a, y−x〉 for all y ∈ S. Since ‖a‖∗ = L
by construction, the desired conclusion follows.
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We now present another technical lemma that characterizes quasi-concave functions via the class
of “hockey stick” support functions. This lemma will provide a theoretical function for the disjunctive
programming reformulation of P and P( ~X; v∗).
Lemma B.2. Let f : Rd → R. The following assertions hold.
(i) Suppose that f is quasi-concave and L−Lipschitz continuous with respect to ‖ · ‖∞. Then
f(x) = inf
j∈J
hj(x), ∀x ∈ domf, (15)
where J is possibly infinite and hj(x) = max{〈aj , x〉+ bj , cj} for ‖aj‖1 ≤ L, j ∈ J .
(ii) If f has a representation as Eq. (15), then it is quasi-concave.
(iii) For any finite set Θ ∈ Rd and values {vθ}θ∈Θ, fˆ : Rd → R defined by
fˆ(x) := inf
v,a
v
s.t. v + max{〈a, θ − x〉, 0} ≥ vθ,∀θ ∈ Θ,
(16)
is quasi-concave. Furthermore, the graph of fˆ is the quasi-concave envelop for the set of points
{(θ, vθ) : θ ∈ Θ}.
Proof. See Haskell et al. (2018) for the complete proof. For Part (i), we use Lemma B.1. For Part
(iii), Haskell et al. (2018) prove that fˆ0 : Rd → R defined by
fˆ0(x) := inf
a,b,c
max{〈a, x〉+ b, c}
s.t. max{〈a, θ〉+ b, c} ≥ vθ,∀θ ∈ Θ,
(17)
is quasi-concave. We will prove that fˆ = fˆ0 by showing Problem (16) and (17) are equivalent.
For any fixed x, suppose (a, b, c) is feasible for Problem (17) and let v := max {〈a, x〉+ b, c}.
We will show that (v, a) is feasible for Problem (16) and achieves the same objective value. First,
v + max {〈a, θ − x〉, 0} ≥ max {〈a, θ〉+ b, c} since
max {〈a, x〉+ b, c}+ max {〈a, θ − x〉, 0} ≥ max {〈a, θ〉+ b, c} ,
is trivially true. Hence, v + max {〈a, θ − x〉, 0} ≥ vθ for all θ ∈ Θ. It follows that (v, a) is feasible
for Problem (16), and that the objective values of Problem(16) and (17) are equal by construc-
tion. Now suppose (v, a) is feasible for Problem (16), and let c := v and b := c − 〈a, x〉. Then
max {〈a, θ〉+ b, c} = max {〈a, θ − x〉+ v, v} ≥ vθ for all θ ∈ Θ. It follows that (a, b, c) is feasible
for Problem (17), and again the objective values of the two problems are the same by definition.
The strategy of the following proof to verify the correctness of the disjunctive programming
formulation of the value problem is similar to Armbruster and Delage (2015).
Lemma B.3. Suppose Assumption 4.1 holds, then Problem P is equivalent to Problem (1).
Proof. Given a value vector v = (vθ)θ∈Θ, we define the set
R(v) := {φ : L → R : φ(θ) = vθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ}
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of all choice functions that match these values on Θ. We then have the following equivalences:
P ≡ inf
φ∈R(E)
∑
θ∈Θ
φ(θ)
≡ min
v∈R|Θ|
inf
φ∈R(E)∩R(v)
∑
θ∈Θ
φ(θ)
≡ min
v∈R|Θ|
{∑
θ∈Θ
vθ : ∃φ ∈ R (E) ∩R(v)
}
.
Next we define the additional constraint sets
RNo := {φ : L → R : [Nor]}, RLi := {φ : L → R : [Lip]}, REl := {φ : L → R : [Eli]}.
Then, using the fact R (E) = RNo ∩RLi ∩REl ∩RQco, we see that
P = min
v∈R|Θ|
∑
θ∈Θ
vθ
s.t. φ ∈ RNo ∩R(v), φ ∈ RLi ∩R(v), φ ∈ REl ∩R(v),
φ ∈ RQco ∩R(v).
The constraint φ ∈ RNo ∩ R(v) is equivalent to Eq. (1e); the constraint φ ∈ RLi ∩ R(v) is
equivalent to Eq. (1c); and the constraint φ ∈ REl ∩ R(v) is equivalent to Eq. (1d). Note
that these constraints only restrict the values of φ on Θ via the choice of value vector v. Finally,
the constraint φ ∈ RQco ∩ R(v) is equivalent to Eq. (1b) which requires the support function
~Z → max
{
〈sθ, ~Z − θ〉, 0
}
to majorize φ on Θ.
Next we verify the correctness of the disjunctive programming formulation of the interpolation
problem.
Lemma B.4. Suppose Assumption 4.1 holds, and let v∗ be the optimal solution of Problem P.
Then, ψR(E)
(
~X
)
= val(P( ~X; v∗)) for all ~X ∈ L.
Proof. First, by Theorem 3.4 we have
ψR(E)
(
~X
)
= inf
φ∈RQCo
{φ
(
~X
)
: [Lip], φ(θ) ≥ ψR(E)(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ}.
Since v∗ is the optimal solution of Problem P, for any ~X ∈ L we have the equality
ψR(E)
(
~X
)
= min
v
{
v ∈ R : φ
(
~X
)
= v, φ ∈ RQCo, [Lip], φ(θ) ≥ ψR(E)(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ
}
.
The value ψR(E)
(
~X
)
is equal to the optimal value of:
min
a, v
v (18a)
s.t. v + max
{
〈a, θ − ~X〉, 0
}
≥ v∗θ , ∀θ ∈ Θ, (18b)
a ≥ 0, ‖a‖1 ≤ L. (18c)
In particular, Eq. (18b) ensures that the support function ~Z → max
{
〈a, ~Z − ~X〉, 0
}
majorizes φ
on Θ via the value vector v∗. Finally, Eq. (18c) enforces property [Lip].
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B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3 (correctness of sorting algorithm)
We repeat the value function problem P here for ease of reference:
min
v, s
∑
θ∈Θ
vθ (19a)
s.t. vθ + max {〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉, 0} ≥ vθ′ , ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Ê , (19b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, ∀θ ∈ Θ, (19c)
vθ ≥ vθ′ , ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ E , (19d)
vW0 = 0. (19e)
Our ultimate goal is to solve Problem (19). We prove that the values v = (uθ)θ∈Θ corresponding to
D returned by Algorithm 1 are the optimal solution of Problem (19) in the following three steps:
1. First, we verify that the candidate solution constructed in Algorithm 1 is well-defined.
2. Second, we verify that this candidate solution gives a lower bound on the optimal solution of
Problem (19).
3. Finally, we verify that this candidate solution is also feasible for Problem (19). Thus, it must
be the (unique) optimal solution of Problem (19).
We will now justify the procedure of Algorithm 1, taking Problem (19) as the starting point.
We first present a modified version of Algorithm 1 that recursively constructs a candidate solution
to Problem (19) by selecting one prospect at a time. This modification of Algorithm 1 is just a
convenient artifact of this proof. We will later verify that it is the same as Algorithm 1.
We let Dt for t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1 denote the intermediate lists constructed in the course of this
algorithm, where necessarily D1 = {(W0, 0)}. Given Dt (which is composed of tuples (θ′, uθ′)) and
θ /∈ Dt, consider the disjunctive program:
PD(θ; Dt) := min
vθ,sθ
vθ (20a)
s.t. vθ + max{〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉 , 0} ≥ uθ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ Dt, (20b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, (20c)
vθ ≥ uθ′ , ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ E , θ′ ∈ Dt. (20d)
There are some similarities between Problem PD(θ; Dt) and Problem (19). However, Problem
PD(θ; Dt) is different since it only tries to minimize vθ and it only enforces a subset of the con-
straints of Problem (19). There are also some similarities between ProblemPD(θ; Dt) and Problem
P(θ; Dt) that is called by pi(θ; Dt). For now it is more convenient for us to use PD(θ; Dt), and
then establish equivalence with pi(θ; Dt) later.
A modified version of Algorithm 1 follows that is based on solving a sequence of instances of
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Problem PD(θ; Dt).
Algorithm 5: (Modified) sorting algorithm for the value problem
Result: A decomposition D.
Initialization: Θ, t = 0, and Dt = {(W0, 0)};
while t < J do
Choose θ∗ ∈ arg maxθ′ /∈Dt val(PD(θ′; Dt)), and set uθ∗ := val(PD(θ∗; Dt));
Set Dt+1 := {Dt, (θ∗, uθ∗)};
Set t := t+ 1;
end
return D := DJ .
Algorithm 5 is similar to Algorithm 1, except that it uses the optimal value of the disjunctive
programming problem PD(θ′; Dt) in place of the predictor pi(θ′; Dt) (which is a function of the
optimal value of an LP). We pause to verify that the recursive construction of Algorithm 5 is well-
defined.
Lemma B.5. For all t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1, val(PD(θ; Dt)) is finite.
Proof. Since W0 has value 0, and every prospect is finite, the optimal value val(PD(θ; D1)) is finite
because of the Lipschitz constraint. By induction, every sorted prospect in Dt has finite uθ−value
and so the optimal value val(PD(θ; Dt)) is also finite.
Additionally, we verify that Algorithm 5 will output a monotone decreasing sequence of {uθ}θ∈Θ
values in D.
Lemma B.6. If θ precedes θ′ in D, then uθ ≥ uθ′ .
Proof. Suppose θt succeeds Dt and θt+1 succeeds Dt+1 (this means θt+1 must succeed θt in D). Let
(vtθt+1 , s
t
θt+1
) denote the optimal solution of Problem PD(θt+1; Dt). Since
θt ∈ arg max
θ/∈Dt
val(PD(θ; Dt)),
we must have uθt = val(PD(θt; Dt)) ≥ val(PD(θt+1; Dt)) = vtθt+1 . Then, we see that (vθt+1 , sθt+1) :=
(uθt , s
t
θt+1
) is feasible for Problem PD(θt+1; Dt+1) since (vtθt+1 , stθt+1) is feasible and uθt ≥ vtθt+1 .
Thus, val(PD(θt+1; Dt+1)) ≤ uθt and we have uθt ≥ uθt+1 . The conclusion follows by induction.
Next we will verify that the construction of Algorithm 5 is a lower bound on the optimal value
of Problem (19). We recall:
min
v, s
vθ (21a)
s.t. vθ + max {〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉, 0} ≥ vθ′ , ∀θ 6= θ′ ∈ Θ, (21b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, ∀θ ∈ Θ, (21c)
vθ ≥ vθ′ , ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ E , (21d)
vW0 = 0, (21e)
which is equivalent to Problem P(θ).
Lemma B.7. For all t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1, val(PD(θ; Dt)) ≤ ψR(E)(θ) for all θ /∈ Dt.
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Proof. We prove this statement by induction starting with D1 = W0. We see val(PD(θ; D1)) is a
lower bound for ψR(E)(θ) for all θ /∈ D1 (this is automatic because PD(θ; D1) has fewer constraints
than Problem (21) which computes ψR(E)(θ) exactly). Proceeding inductively, if every estimate in
Dt is a lower bound on the corresponding ψR(E)(θ′) for all θ′ ∈ Dt, then the optimal value of Problem
PD(θ; Dt) is a lower bound for all θ /∈ Dt (this follows becausePD(θ; Dt) has fewer constraints than
Problem (21), and by induction all of the values vθ′ for θ
′ ∈ Dt are themselves lower bounds).
Next, we will verify that the construction of Algorithm 5 is also feasible for Problem (19).
Lemma B.8. The value vector v = (uθ)θ∈Θ corresponding to D is feasible for Problem (19).
Proof. Fix θ ∈ Θ, and suppose θ is the succeeding prospect of Dt for some t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1. By
Lemma B.6 (on monotonicity), uθ ≥ uθ′ for all θ′ /∈ Dt. As a result, Eqs. (19b) and (19c) are
satisfied for (θ, θ′) with θ′ /∈ Dt, and hence for all pairs (θ, θ′) with θ′ ∈ Θ (because this constraint
is already satisfied for all (θ, θ′) with θ′ ∈ Dt in Problem PD(θ;Dt)). Eq. (19d) is also satisfied for
all (θ, θ′) with θ′ /∈ Dt, and hence for all (θ, θ′) with θ′ ∈ Θ (again, because this constraint is already
satisfied for all (θ, θ′) with θ′ ∈ Dt in Problem PD(θ;Dt)). This reasoning applies to all θ ∈ Θ, and
so the constructed candidate solution is feasible.
Finally, we will show that val(PD(θ; Dt)) is given by the following LP:
P(θ; Dt) := min
vθ,sθ
vθ (22a)
s.t. vθ + 〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉 ≥ uθ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ Dt, (22b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, (22c)
vθ ≥ uθ′ , ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ E , θ′ ∈ Dt, (22d)
which we defined earlier for Algorithm 1. In particular, we establish that
val(PD(θ; Dt)) = pi(θ;Dt) = min{val(P(θ; Dt)), vt}.
Lemma B.9. For all t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1, val(PD(θ; Dt)) = pi(θ;Dt) for all θ /∈ Dt.
Proof. First, we note that every feasible solution of P(θ;Dt) is also feasible for PD(θ;Dt), so we
must have val(PD(θ; Dt)) ≤ val(P(θ; Dt)). Now let vθ = val(PD(θ; Dt)) and consider the two
cases: (i) vθ < vt and (ii) vθ = vt (due to monotonicity, the case vθ > vt will not occur).
In the first case, we have vθ < uθ′ for every θ
′ ∈ Dt. Thus, the constraint vθ+max{〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉 , 0} ≥
uθ′ in ProblemPD(θ; Dt) is equivalent to vθ+〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉 ≥ uθ′ (or it would otherwise be infeasible).
Hence, Problem PD(θ; Dt) is equivalent to Problem P(θ; Dt) and we have vθ = val(P(θ; Dt)).
In the second case, we have
vt = vθ = val(PD(θ; Dt)) ≤ val(P(θ; Dt)),
and it follows that pi(θ;Dt) = vt = vθ. To conclude, in both cases we have vθ = pi(θ;Dt).
By Lemma B.9, we can now claim that Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 5 are equivalent. To conclude
the proof of Theorem 4.3, since the output of Algorithm 1 is both a lower bound and a feasible
solution, it follows that Algorithm 1 returns the unique optimal solution of Problem (19).
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C Proofs for Section 5 (acceptance set representation)
C.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1 (interpolation for a fixed act)
Given ~X ∈ L, suppose we want to calculate vX = ψR(E)( ~X). We can do this using Algorithm 1 to
construct a decomposition DJ+2 of the set Θ ∪ {θJ+1} ∪ { ~X}. We consider two cases: (i) vX = vt
for some t = 1, . . . , J and (ii) vt+1 < vX < vt for some t = 1, . . . , J .
For the first case where vX = vt for some t = 1, . . . , J , suppose that val(P( ~X;Dt)) ≥ vt (or
equivalently that pi( ~X; Dt) ≥ vt). By the properties of Algorithm 1, ~X precedes any prospect that
is not in Dt. Suppose ~X is the succeeding prospect of Dt′ for some t′ ≤ t, then it follows that
ψR(E)( ~X) = pi( ~X; Dt′) ≥ vt′ ≥ vt.
Conversely, if ψR(E)( ~X) ≥ vt, then ~X must precede any prospect that is not in Dt. Again sup-
pose ~X is the succeeding prospect of Dt′ for some t′ ≤ t. We then have that val(PD( ~X;Dt)) ≥
val(PD( ~X;Dt′)) = ψR(E)( ~X) where the inequality follows because Problem PD( ~X;Dt′) has fewer
constraints than Problem PD( ~X;Dt). It then follows that
val(P( ~X;Dt)) ≥ val(PD( ~X;Dt)) ≥ vt,
where we use the fact that val(PD(θ; Dt)) ≤ val(P(θ; Dt)) (see the proof of Lemma B.9).
For the second case where vt+1 < vX < vt for some t = 1, . . . , J , we can artificially find an
prospect θv ∈ L such that ψR(E)(θv) = vX (by continuity of the choice function, we can always
find such an act). Then, we can insert the prospect θv into DJ+1 to create the same setting as the
previous case (i.e., ψR(E)( ~X) ≥ v ⇐⇒ pi( ~X; Dt) ≥ v).
C.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2 (acceptance set representation)
For vt+1 < v ≤ vt for some t = 1, . . . , J , by Proposition 5.1 we know that ~X ∈ Av if and
only if val(P( ~X; Dt)) ≥ v. By strong duality, this is equivalent to requiring val(D( ~X;Dt)) =
val(P( ~X; Dt)) ≥ v. However, since Problem D( ~X;Dt) is a maximization problem, this latter in-
equality reduces to the feasibility problem:{
(p, q) :
∑
θ∈Dt
v∗θ · pθ − Lq ≥ v,
∑
θ∈Dt
θ · pθ − ~X ≤ q,
∑
θ∈Dt
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0
}
.
Since
(∑
θ∈Dt v
∗
θ · pθ − v
)
/L ≥ q and ∑θ∈Dt θ · pθ − ~X ≤ q, we can eliminate q from the above
feasibility problem to obtain:{
p :
∑
θ∈Dt
θ · pθ − ~X ≤ (
∑
θ∈Dt
v∗θ · pθ − v)/L,
∑
θ∈Dt
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0
}
.
We then have ∑
θ∈Dt
θ · pθ − (
∑
θ∈Dt
v∗θ · pθ − v)/L =
∑
θ∈Dt
(θ − v∗θ/L) pθ + v/L,
and so the desired result follows from the definition of θ˜.
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C.3 Proof of Theorem 5.3 (aspirational preferences)
By Proposition 2.1, we have
ψR(E)( ~X) = sup{v ≤ 0 : ~X ∈ Av}, ∀ ~X ∈ L,
where Av is the acceptance set of ψR(E) at level v ≤ 0. By Theorem 5.2, we can write Av explicitly
as:
Av =
 ~X | ~X ≥
κ(v)∑
j=0
θ˜ · pθ + v/L,
κ(v)∑
j=0
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0
 .
It then follows that:
ψR(E)( ~X) = sup
v ≤ 0 | ~X ≥
κ(v)∑
j=0
θ˜ · pθ + v/L,
κ(v)∑
j=0
pθ = 1, p ≥ 0

= sup
{
v ≤ 0 | ~X − v/L+ cκ(v) ∈ Aµκ(v)
}
= sup
{
v ≤ 0 | µκ(v)( ~X − v/L+ cκ(v)) ≤ 0
}
= sup
{
v ≤ 0 | µκ(v)( ~X − τ(v)) ≤ 0
}
.
In the above display: the second equality follows from the definition of coherent risk measure µt
where t = κ(v); the third equality follows from the fact that µ(~Z) ≤ 0 for ~Z ∈ L if and only if
~Z ∈ Aµ; and the last equality follows from the definition of the target function τ(v).
D Proofs for Section 6 (binary search algorithm for PRO)
D.1 Proof of Proposition 6.2 (lower bound for optimal value)
By Proposition 6.1, the inequality ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≥ v is equivalent to feasibility of the system Fv(Dt)
for t = κ(v). We then have the following chain of equivalences:{
∃z ∈ Z, ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≥ v
}
⇐⇒ {Fv(Dt) feasible} ,{
max
z∈Z
ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≥ v
}
⇐⇒ {max {v′ | Fv′(Dt) feasible} ≥ v} ,{
max
z∈Z
ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≥ v
}
⇐⇒ {val(G (Dt)) ≥ v}.
D.2 Proof of Corollary 6.3 (lower bound for optimal value)
By Proposition 6.2, for vt+1 < v ≤ vt, we have the equivalence
{
maxz∈Z ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≥ v
}
⇐⇒
{val(G (Dt)) ≥ v}. We then have the following chain of equivalences:{
max
z∈Z
ψR(E)(~G(z)) > vt+1
}
⇐⇒
{
∃vt ≥ v > vt+1, max
z∈Z
ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≥ v
}
,
⇐⇒ {∃vt ≥ v > vt+1, val(G (Dt)) ≥ v} ,
⇐⇒ {val(G (Dt)) > vt+1} .
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D.3 Proof of Theorem 6.4 (correctness of binary search algorithm)
Proposition 6.2 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal value of Problem (PRO)
to satisfy maxz∈Z ψR(E)(~G(z)) > vt. Hence, the binary search procedure in Algorithm 2, which
terminates after O(logH) iterations, finds t = ζ such that vζ+1 < maxz∈Z ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≤ vζ . Let
(z˜∗, p˜∗, v˜∗) be the optimal solution of Problem G (Dζ). We want to show that z˜∗ is an optimal
solution of Problem (PRO). We consider two cases: (i) v˜∗ ≤ vζ and (ii) v˜∗ > vζ .
In the first case where v˜∗ ≤ vζ , we claim the inequality ψR(E)(~G(z∗)) ≤ v˜∗. Note that v˜∗ is the
largest value v such that Fv(Dζ) is feasible. By definition, there is no z such that ~G(z) ∈ Av for
any level v > v˜∗. It then follows that ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≤ v˜∗ for all z ∈ Z.
In the second case where v˜∗ > vζ , we claim that ~G(z˜
∗) ∈ Avζ . It will then follow that z˜∗
is optimal for Problem (PRO) under the condition maxz∈Z ψR(E)(~G(z)) ≤ vζ . The claim is true
because the solution (z˜∗, p˜∗, v˜∗) is optimal for Problem G (Dζ), and thus it is automatically feasible
for Problem G (Dζ) as well. Hence, it follows from the inequality v˜∗ > vζ that (z˜∗, p˜∗, vζ) is also
feasible and so ~G(z˜∗) ∈ Avζ .
By combining these two cases, we conclude with the observation that the optimal value of Problem
(PRO) satisfies ψR(E)(~G(z∗)) = min{v˜∗, vζ}.
E Proofs for Section 7 (the law invariant case)
Recall that the underlying sample space is Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωT }. For a permutation σ ∈ Σ, we
permute the sample space Ω as σ(Ω) = {ωσ(1), ωσ(2), . . . , ωσ(T )}. Similarly, we permute the long
vector ~X as σ( ~X) = (X(ωσ(t)))
T
t=1, where the realizations are listed in the same order as σ(Ω). A
law invariant choice function φ ∈ RQCo must satisfy φ( ~X) = φ(σ( ~X)) for all ~X ∈ L and σ ∈ Σ when
the underlying probability measure on Ω is uniform.
E.1 Proof of Proposition 7.3 (characterization of optimal solution of law
invariant value problem)
The uniqueness of the optimal solution of Problem PL follows the same argument as Theorem 4.2
for the base case. To obtain a decomposition D = DJL of the augmented support set ΘL, we can
still (conceptually) apply Algorithm 1. We claim that there is a decomposition DJL such that:
1. v∗σ(θ) = v
∗
σ′(θ) for all σ, σ
′ ∈ Σ and θ ∈ Θ.
2. all permutations of each θ ∈ Θ are seated next to each other (i.e., the first |Σ| elements
of DJL are {(σ(W0), v∗σ(W0))}σ∈Σ for the normalizing prospect, the next |Σ| elements are
{(σ(θ), v∗σ(θ))}σ∈Σ for some θ ∈ Θ, etc.).
We verify this claim by induction. For the base case of W0, we require every permutation σ(W0)
for all σ ∈ Σ to have value 0 and hence necessarily D|Σ| = {(σ(W0), 0)}σ∈Σ. Now suppose the
intermediate list constructed by Algorithm 1 is D|Σ|t for some t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1. The intermediate
set D|Σ|t satisfies:
1. σ(θ′) ∈ D|Σ|t when θ′ ∈ D|Σ|t.
2. v∗σ(θ′) = v
∗
θ′ for all θ
′ ∈ D|Σ|t and σ ∈ Σ.
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It can then be shown that every permutation of θ must have the same predicted value if θ is the
succeeding prospect of D|Σ|t. For a permutation σ ∈ Σ, Problem P(σ(θ); D|Σ|t) is
min
sσ,vσ
vσ (23a)
s.t. vσ + 〈sσ, σ′(θ′)− σ(θ)〉 ≥ v∗θ , ∀θ′ ∈ D|Σ|t,∀σ′ ∈ Σ, (23b)
sσ ≥ 0, ‖sσ‖1 ≤ L, (23c)
vσ ≥ v∗θ′ , ∀(σ(θ), θ′) ∈ E , θ′ ∈ D|Σ|t. (23d)
We will show that, given any feasible solution (sσ, vσ) to Problem (23), we can construct a solution
(sσ′′ , vσ′′) that is feasible for Problem P(σ′′(θ); D|Σ|t) and achieves the same objective value. In
particular, we will construct sσ′′ := σ
′′ (σ−1(sσ)) and vσ′′ := vσ.
Indeed, the objective values are trivially equal. To verify constraint (23b), we compute:
vσ′′ + 〈sσ′′ , σ′(θ′)− σ′′(θ)〉
=vσ′′ + 〈σ′′
(
σ−1(sσ)
)
, σ′(θ′)− σ′′(θ)〉
=vσ′′ + 〈σ−1(sσ), σ′′−1(σ′(θ′))− θ〉
=vσ′′ + 〈sσ, σ(σ′′−1(σ′(θ′)))− σ(θ)〉 ≥ v∗θ .
The verification for constraints (23c) and (23d) is immediate. We conclude that every permutation of
θ will achieve the same optimal value val(P(θ; D|Σ|t)), and thus the same predicted value pi(θ; D|Σ|t).
Hence all permutations of θ, as well as their predicted value, can be appended to D|Σ|t and form
D|Σ|(t+1). The desired result follows by induction.
E.2 Proof of Proposition 7.4 (characterization of optimal solution of law
invariant interpolation problem)
First, given a value vector v = (vθ)θ∈Θ we recall that Problem PL( ~X; v) reduces to:
min
vX , a
vX (24a)
s.t. vX + max
{
〈a, σ(θ)− ~X〉, 0
}
≥ vθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ, σ ∈ Σ, (24b)
a ≥ 0, ‖a‖1 ≤ L. (24c)
We want to show that val(PL( ~X; v)) = val(PL(σ′( ~X); v)) for all σ′ ∈ Σ. Given any feasible solution
(vX , a) of Problem PL( ~X; v), we can construct a feasible solution (vσ′(X), aσ′) that is feasible for
PL(σ′( ~X); v) and achieves the same objective value. In particular, we will take vσ′(X) := vX and
aσ′ := σ
′(a).
Indeed, the objective values are trivially equal. To verify constraint (24b), we compute:
vσ′(X) + max
{
〈aσ′ , σ(θ)− σ′( ~X)〉, 0
}
=vX + max
{
〈σ′(a), σ(θ)− σ′( ~X)〉, 0
}
=vX + max
{
〈a, σ′−1(σ(θ))− ~X〉, 0
}
≥ vθ.
The verification of constraint (24c) is immediate, and the desired results follows.
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E.3 Proof of Theorem 7.5 (two-stage decomposition of law invariant ro-
bust choice function)
The function ψR(EL) is law-invariant and belongs to R(EL), thus it also belongs to RL (E). So, we
must have ψRL(E)( ~X) ≤ ψR(EL)( ~X) for all ~X ∈ L. Conversely, by [Law] any φ ∈ RL (E) satisfies
[Eli] on the augmented ECDS EL. Thus, we have the inclusion RL (E) ⊂ R (EL) and it follows that
ψRL(E)( ~X) ≥ ψR(EL)( ~X). So, we have the equality ψRL(E)( ~X) = ψR(EL)( ~X) for all ~X ∈ L. The
desired decomposition result then follows from Theorem 3.4 applied to the augmented ECDS.
E.4 Proof of Proposition 7.6 (reduction of law invariant interpolation
problem)
There are exponentially many constraints in (10b) due to the index σ ∈ Σ. Constraint (10b) is
equivalent to:
min
σ∈Σ
〈s, σ(θ′)〉 − 〈s, θ〉+ vθ − v∗θ′ ≥ 0, ∀θ′ ∈ DL,t. (25)
We will reduce the optimization problem minσ∈Σ〈s, σ(θ′)〉 in Eq. (25). Recall that sn is the subgra-
dient of φ at θ corresponding to attribute n = 1, 2, . . . , N . The optimal value of minσ∈Σ〈s, σ(θ′)〉 in
Eq. (25) is equal to the optimal value of:
min
Q∈RT×T
N∑
n=1
s>nQθ
′
n (26a)
s.t. Q>
−→
1 =
−→
1 , (26b)
Q
−→
1 =
−→
1 , (26c)
Qm,l ∈ {0, 1}, l, m = 1, . . . , T, (26d)
which is a linear assignment problem. Here Q is the permutation matrix corresponding to σ so
that Qθ′n = σ(θ
′
n) for all n = 1, . . . , N (the permutation must be the same for all attributes, hence
we only have a single permutation matrix Q). Problem (26) can be solved exactly by relaxing the
binary constraints Qm,l ∈ {0, 1} to 0 ≤ Qm,l ≤ 1 for all l, m = 1, . . . , T . Strong duality holds for
the relaxed problem, and the optimal value of the relaxed problem is equal to:
max
w,y∈RT
−→
1 >w +
−→
1 >y (27a)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
θ′ns
>
n − w
−→
1 > −−→1 y> ≥ 0. (27b)
It follows that constraint (25) is satisfied if and only if there exists w and y such that:
−→
1 >w +
−→
1 >y − 〈s, θ〉+ vθ − v∗θ′ ≥ 0, (28a)
N∑
n=1
θ′ns
>
n − w
−→
1 > −−→1 y> ≥ 0. (28b)
We substitute the above display into constraint (10b) to obtain the desired reduction.
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E.5 Proof of Theorem 7.7 (correctness of sorting algorithm for law in-
variant value problem)
We repeat the law invariant value function problem here for ease of reference:
PL := min
v, s
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
σ∈Σ
vσ(θ) (29a)
s.t. vσ(θ) + max
{〈sσ(θ), σ′(θ′)− σ(θ)〉, 0} ≥ vσ′(θ′), ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ Ê , σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, (29b)
sσ(θ) ≥ 0, ‖sσ(θ)‖1 ≤ L, ∀θ ∈ Θ, σ ∈ Σ, (29c)
vσ(θ) ≥ vσ′(θ′), ∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ E , ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, (29d)
vσ(W0) = 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ. (29e)
Our ultimate goal is to solve Problem (29). Proposition 7.3 already establishes the relationship
between the decomposition DJL (of the augmented ECDS) and the decomposition DL,J (of the
original ECDS while enforcing [Law]). By law invariance, for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, we know
that σ(θ) precedes σ′(θ′) if and only if θ precedes θ′. We will prove that Algorithm 3 correctly
returns DL,J = DL. In addition, the value vector v = (uθ)θ∈Θ corresponding to DL is optimal for
Problem (29). Our proof follows three steps:
1. First, we verify that the candidate solution constructed in Algorithm 3 is well-defined.
2. Second, we verify that this candidate solution gives a lower bound on the optimal solution of
Problem (29)
3. Finally, we verify that this candidate solution is also feasible for Problem (29). Thus, it must
be the (unique) optimal solution of Problem (29).
Our proof is based on a modified version of Algorithm 3 that recursively constructs a candidate
solution to Problem (29) by selecting one prospect in Θ at a time. We will show that this modified
algorithm has the properties that we seek, and then we will confirm that it is actually equivalent to
Algorithm 3. We let DL,t (which is composed of tuples (θ, uθ)) for t = 0, 1, . . . , J − 1 denote the in-
termediate sets constructed in the course of this procedure, where necessarily DL,1 = {(W0, 0)}. The
procedure will eventually exhaust all prospects in Θ and terminate with a completely sorted DL,J .
Given DL,t, or equivalently Σ(DL,t) (where we recall that Σ(DL,t) := {(σ(θ), v∗σ(θ))σ∈Σ}θ∈DL,t),
consider the disjunctive program:
PD(θ; Σ(DL,t)) := min
vθ,sθ
vθ (30a)
s.t. vθ + max{〈sθ, σ′(θ′)− θ〉 , 0} ≥ uθ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ DL,t, σ′ ∈ Σ, (30b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, (30c)
vθ ≥ uθ′ , ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ E , θ′ ∈ DL,t. (30d)
For the purpose of our proof, it is convenient for us to work with PD(θ; Σ(DL,t)). We establish
equivalence between PD(θ; Σ(DL,t)) and piL(θ; DL,t) later.
A modified version of Algorithm 3 follows that is based on solving a sequence of instances of
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Problem PD(θ; Σ(DL,t)).
Algorithm 6: (Modified) sorting algorithm for the law invariant value problem
Result: A decomposition DL.
Initialization: Θ, t = 0, and DL,t = {(W0, 0)};
while t < J do
Choose θ∗ ∈ arg maxθ/∈DL,tPD(θ; Σ(DL,t)), and set uθ∗ := val(PD(θ; Σ(DL,t)));
Set DL,t+1 := {DL,t, (θ∗, uθ∗)};
Set t := t+ 1;
end
return DL := DL,J .
Algorithm 6 is similar to Algorithm 3, except that it uses the optimal value of the disjunctive
programming problem PD(θ; Σ(DL,t)) in place of the predictor piL(θ; DL,t) (which is based on
solving an LP).
In iteration t = 1, . . . , J − 1 of Algorithm 6, we are given Σ(DL,t). We then choose any
θ ∈ arg max
θ′ /∈DL,t
val(PD(θ
′; Σ(DL,t))),
set uθ := val(PD(θ; Σ(DL,t))), and then append (θ, uθ) to DL,t to form DL,t+1.
We pause to verify that this recursive construction of Algorithm 6 is well-defined. The following
two lemmas share the same proof as Lemma B.5 and Lemma B.6, because the optimization problems
PD(θ; Σ(DL,t)) and PD(θ; DL,t) only differ in the number of prospects.
Lemma E.1. For all t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1, val(PD(θ; Σ(DL,t))) is finite.
Lemma E.2. Let DL be the final output of Algorithm 6. Then, uθ ≥ uθ′ if θ precedes θ′ in DL.
Next we will verify that the construction of Algorithm 6 is a lower bound on the optimal value
of Problem (29). For any θ ∈ Θ, we recall that Problem PL(θ) is explicitly:
min
v, s
vθ (31a)
s.t. vσ(θ) + max
{〈sσ(θ), σ′(θ′)− σ(θ)〉, 0} ≥ vσ′(θ′), ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, θ 6= θ′ ∈ Θ, (31b)
sσ(θ) ≥ 0, ‖sσ(θ)‖1 ≤ L, ∀σ ∈ Σ, θ ∈ Θ, (31c)
vσ(θ) ≥ vσ′(θ′), ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ,∀ (θ, θ′) ∈ E , (31d)
vσ(W0) = 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ. (31e)
Lemma E.3. For all t = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1, val(PD(θ; Σ(DL,t))) ≤ ψRL(E)(θ) for all θ /∈ DL,t.
Proof. We prove this statement by induction starting withD1 = {(W0, 0)}. We see val(PD(θ; Σ(D1)))
is a lower bound for ψRL(E)(θ) for all θ /∈ D1 (this is automatic because PD(θ; Σ(D1))) has fewer
constraints than Problem (31) which computes ψRL(E)(θ) exactly). Since ψRL(E)(θ) = ψRL(E)(σ(θ))
for all σ ∈ Σ, val(PD(θ; Σ(D1))) is also a lower bound of ψRL(E)(σ(θ)).
Proceeding inductively, if every estimate in DL,t is a lower bound on the corresponding value
ψRL(E)(θ
′) for all θ′ ∈ DL,t, then the optimal value of Problem PD(θ; Σ(DL,t)) is a lower bound for
all θ /∈ DL,t (this follows because PD(θ; Σ(DL,t)) has fewer constraints than Problem (31), and by
induction all of the values vθ′ for θ
′ ∈ DL,t are themselves lower bounds).
Next, we will verify that the construction of Algorithm 6 is also feasible for Problem (29).
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Lemma E.4. Let v = (vσ(θ))θ∈Θ, σ∈Σ where vσ(θ) = uθ for all θ ∈ Θ, then v is feasible for Problem
(29).
Proof. Suppose θ ∈ Θ is the succeeding prospect of DL,t for some t. By Lemma E.2 (on monotonic-
ity), uθ ≥ uθ′ for all θ′ /∈ DL,t. As a result, Eq. (29b) is satisfied for all pairs (θ, θ′) with θ′ /∈ DL,t
and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, and hence for all (θ, θ′) with θ′ ∈ Θ and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ (because this constraint is already
satisfied for all (θ, θ′) with θ′ ∈ DL,t and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ in PD(θ; Σ(DL,t))). Constraint (29d) is also
satisfied for all (θ, θ′) with θ′ /∈ DL,t and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, and hence for all (θ, θ′) with θ′ ∈ Θ and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ
(again, because this constraint is already satisfied for all (θ, θ′) with θ′ ∈ DL,t and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ in
PD(θ; Σ(DL,t))). This reasoning applies to every θ ∈ Θ, and so the constructed candidate solution
is feasible.
Now to complete our proof of the correctness of the law invariant sorting algorithm, we will show
that val(PD(θ; Σ(DL,t))) is related to the following LP:
P(θ; Σ(DL,t)) := min
vθ,sθ
vθ (32a)
s.t. vθ + 〈sθ, θ′ − θ〉 ≥ uθ′ , ∀θ′ ∈ DL,t, σ′ ∈ Σ, (32b)
sθ ≥ 0, ‖sθ‖1 ≤ L, (32c)
vθ ≥ uθ′ , ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ E , θ′ ∈ DL,t. (32d)
In particular, we establish
val(PD(θ; Σ(DL,t))) = pi(θ; Σ(DL,t)) := min{val(P(θ; Σ(DL,t))), vL,t}.
The following result is a direct consequence of Lemma B.9 because uσ(θ) = uσ′(θ) for all θ and
σ, σ′ ∈ Σ.
Lemma E.5. For all t = 1, . . . , J − 1, val(PD(θ; Σ(DL,t))) = pi(θ; Σ(DL,t)) for all θ /∈ DL,t.
By Proposition 7.6, we have P(θ; Σ(DL,t)) = PL(θ; DL,t) and hence val(PD(θ; Σ(DL,t))) =
piL(θ;DL,t). We can now claim that Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 6 are equivalent by Lemma E.5.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 7.7, since the output of Algorithm 3 is both a lower bound and
a feasible solution, it follows that Algorithm 3 returns the unique optimal solution of Problem (29).
E.6 Alternative Proof of Theorem 7.7 (correctness of sorting algorithm
for law invariant value problem)
We can also prove Theorem 7.7 by applying Algorithm 1 to obtain a decomposition DJL of ΘL.
Observe that Algorithm 3 only differs from Algorithm 1 in the following respects: (i) the predictor
is changed from pi(θ; Σ(DL,t)) to piL(θ; DL,t); (ii) uθ is calculated as a “representative” and then
applied to all permutations σ(θ) of θ. We show that Algorithm 1 applied to Problem PL correctly
preserves these features.
First, by Proposition 7.6, we have equivalence between P(θ; Σ(DL,t)) and PL(θ; DL,t). Hence,
the predictor
piL(θ; DL,t) = min
{
vL,t, val(PL(θ; DL,t))
}
is equal to
pi(θ; Σ(DL,t)) = min
{
vL,t, val(P(θ; Σ(DL,t)))
}
.
Second, we note that the optimal solution v∗ of Problem (29) is unique by Theorem 7.5. Fur-
thermore, the optimal values satisfy v∗σ(θ) = v
∗
σ′(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ by Proposition 7.3.
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It follows that we only need to calculate the value uσ(θ) for any “representative” σ(θ) in order to
obtain all the values {uσ′(θ)}σ′∈Σ. That is, to obtain a decomposition DJL , we can effectively obtain
a decomposition DL,J because uσ(θ) = uσ′(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ.
To conclude, Algorithm 3 is actually equivalent to Algorithm 1 on an augmented ECDS. Hence,
the correctness of Algorithm 3 follows from the correctness of Algorithm 1.
E.7 Proof of Theorem 7.12 (correctness of binary search algorithm)
This proof is similar to proof of Theorem 6.4 for our base case. Proposition 7.10 provides a necessary
and sufficient condition for the inequality maxz∈Z ψRL(E)(~G(z)) > vL,t to hold. Hence the binary
search procedure in Algorithm 4, which terminates after O(logH) iterations, finds t = ζ such
that vL,ζ+1 < maxz∈Z ψRL(E)(~G(z)) ≤ vL,ζ . Now let (z˜∗, p˜∗, q˜∗, ρ˜∗, v˜∗) be the optimal solution of
Problem GL(DL,ζ). We want to show that z˜∗ is optimal for Problem (PRO). We consider two cases:
(i) v˜∗ ≤ vL,ζ and (ii) v˜∗ > vL,ζ .
In the first case where v˜∗ ≤ vL,ζ , we claim that the optimal value of Problem (PRO) satisfies the
inequality ψRL(E)(~G(z
∗)) ≤ v˜∗, and hence z˜∗ is optimal for Problem (PRO). Note that if v˜∗ ≤ vL,ζ ,
the value v˜∗ is the largest value v such that the inclusion ~G(z) ∈ AL,v has a solution. Hence if
v > v˜∗, then there is no z ∈ Z such that ~G(z) ∈ AL,v. It follows that ψRL(E)(~G(z)) ≤ v˜∗ for all
z ∈ Z.
In the second case where v˜∗ > vL,ζ , we claim that ~G(z˜
∗) ∈ AL,vL,ζ and hence that z˜∗ is optimal for
Problem (PRO) under the condition that maxz∈Z ψRL(E)(~G(z)) ≤ vL,ζ . The vector (z˜∗, p˜∗, q˜∗, ρ˜∗, v˜∗)
is an optimal solution of Problem GL(DL,ζ), and so it is necessarily a feasible solution. It then follows
from the inequality v˜∗ > vL,ζ that (z˜
∗, p˜∗, q˜∗, ρ˜∗, vL,ζ) is also feasible for Problem GL(DL,ζ). It goes
back to the first case, and so we have ~G(z˜∗) ∈ AL,vL,ζ .
By combining these two cases, we conclude that the optimal value of Problem (PRO) satisfies
ψRL(E)(~G(z
∗)) = min{v˜∗, vL,ζ}.
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